Marie Patterson v. Georgia Pacific, LLC
38 F.4th 1336
11th Cir.2022Background
- Jacqueline Patterson, a senior HR manager at Georgia Pacific (hired Dec. 2015), previously served as an HR manager at Memorial Hermann and was deposed June 29, 2017 in a Title VII pregnancy-discrimination suit against Memorial Hermann.
- Hawkins (GP HR director) learned Patterson had testified against her former employer, questioned her about the deposition, said her testifying “made things clear,” and one week later Hawkins and the plant manager fired Patterson without stating a reason; she was also offered $50,000 to waive claims.
- Patterson filed an EEOC charge (checked race and retaliation) mentioning both her complaints about race issues at GP and her Memorial Hermann deposition; EEOC issued right-to-sue and Patterson sued pro se under Title VII for retaliation.
- The district court granted summary judgment for Georgia Pacific, adopting (1) a proposed "manager exception"—that managerial employees acting in their job duties cannot engage in protected opposition—and (2) a "current-employer requirement"—that protected opposition must target the employer who retaliated.
- The Eleventh Circuit reversed: it held Patterson exhausted her EEOC remedies, rejected both the manager exception and the current-employer requirement under Title VII’s opposition and participation clauses, and found genuine disputes on causation and pretext requiring a trial.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| EEOC exhaustion (scope of charge) | Charge referenced Memorial Hermann deposition and Hawkins’ reaction; a reasonable EEOC investigation could cover retaliation for that deposition | Charge mainly focused on race; deposition/Title VII participation not sufficiently alleged | Patterson exhausted; charge reasonably encompasses deposition-related retaliation claim |
| Manager exception (are HR managers excluded from protection when acting in job duties?) | Title VII protects “any” employee; opposition focuses on conduct, not job title/duties | Adopted rule from FLSA contexts: managerial employees opposing as part of duties are not protected | Rejected manager exception; no textual basis in Title VII; opposition covers managers |
| Current-employer requirement (must opposition target the retaliating employer?) | Opposition to unlawful practices of any employer or participation in Title VII proceedings is protected; current employer may not retaliate for opposition to a former employer | Protection limited to opposition against the employer who retaliated | Rejected requirement; opposition/participation to a former employer’s practices is protected against retaliation by a current employer |
| Causation & pretext (was firing causally related/pretextual?) | Hawkins knew of deposition, said testimony “made things clear,” fired Patterson one week later; deviations from GP procedures, positive reviews, absence of warnings, and $50,000 waivable-severance offer show pretext | Termination justified by poor performance on union-avoidance task and excessive absences per badge records | Genuine issues of material fact on causation (temporal proximity, knowledge) and pretext (inconsistencies, deviations, statements, severance offer); summary judgment improper |
Key Cases Cited
- Feliciano v. City of Miami Beach, 707 F.3d 1244 (11th Cir.) (summary-judgment standard and crediting non-movant’s version)
- Gogel v. Kia Motors Mfg. of Ga. Inc., 967 F.3d 1121 (11th Cir.) (describing opposition and participation clauses and burden-shifting for retaliation)
- Crawford v. Metropolitan Government of Nashville & Davidson County, 555 U.S. 271 (2009) (ordinary meaning of "opposed" in Title VII context)
- Merritt v. Dillard Paper Co., 120 F.3d 1181 (11th Cir.) (participation clause interpreted broadly)
- McMenemy v. City of Rochester, 241 F.3d 279 (2d Cir.) (Title VII protects employees from retaliation by present or future employers for prior opposition)
- Hurlbert v. St. Mary's Health Care Sys., Inc., 439 F.3d 1286 (11th Cir.) (employer’s deviation from normal procedures can indicate pretext)
- Brungart v. BellSouth Telecommunications, Inc., 231 F.3d 791 (11th Cir.) (close temporal proximity can support causation)