Maricela Leyva Martinez v. Jefferson Sessions III, 892 F.3d 655

Maricela Martinez, a Mexican national present in the U.S. without admission, has three Maryland petty-theft convictions (2007–2016) for small-value thefts.
Immigration authorities charged removability under the INA as crimes involving moral turpitude (CIMTs), which bars cancellation of removal.
An immigration judge and the BIA concluded Martinez’s Maryland theft convictions were CIMTs, relying on BIA precedent (In re Diaz-Lizarraga).
Martinez sought to withdraw an earlier uncounseled concession of removability after obtaining counsel and applied for cancellation of removal. IJ denied withdrawal and relief; BIA affirmed on CIMT ground and did not rule on withdrawal.
The Fourth Circuit reviewed whether Maryland’s consolidated theft statute (§ 7-104) categorically qualifies as a CIMT under the categorical approach and BIA precedent.

Issue	Martinez's Argument	Government/BIA Argument	Held
Whether Maryland § 7-104 is a categorical CIMT	§ 7-104 is overbroad because it criminalizes de minimis/temporary takings (e.g., joyriding), so it is not categorically a CIMT	§ 7-104 requires intent to deprive (per § 7-101 definition) and matches BIA’s theft-as-CIMT standard	Not categorical: statute permits temporary/de minimis takings; vacated BIA determination
Whether the modified categorical approach applies	N/A — Maryland statute is a single consolidated offense, not divisible	BIA treated statute as matching generic theft; relied on Diaz-Lizarraga	Statute is indivisible; modified categorical approach inapplicable
Whether to defer to BIA’s Diaz-Lizarraga standard	Assumed Diaz-Lizarraga applies for analysis, but argues statute still fails even under that standard	BIA’s modernized standard counts substantial temporary deprivations as CIMTs	Applying Diaz-Lizarraga, § 7-104 still allows de minimis takings and thus fails to categorically meet CIMT standard
Whether IJ erred in denying withdrawal of uncounseled concession	Martinez contends denial was erroneous and merits review	IJ and BIA declined to permit withdrawal, BIA declined to address withdrawal on appeal	Court declined to decide withdrawal; remanded for BIA to consider in light of vacatur (Chenery principle)

Sotnikau v. Lynch, 846 F.3d 731 (4th Cir.) (describing categorical approach for CIMTs)
Descamps v. United States, 570 U.S. 254 (2013) (distinguishing divisible statutes and limiting modified categorical approach)
Jimenez-Cedillo v. Sessions, 885 F.3d 292 (4th Cir.) (definition and scope of CIMT)
Uribe v. Sessions, 855 F.3d 622 (4th Cir.) (moral-norm element of CIMT)
Amos v. Lynch, 790 F.3d 512 (4th Cir.) (state-law analysis not entitled to BIA deference)
Lozano-Arredondo v. Sessions, 866 F.3d 1082 (9th Cir.) (state theft statute not CIMT when it covers joyriding/temporary takings)
SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80 (1943) (agency decisions must be sustained on the grounds the agency actually relied upon)
Nken v. Holder, 585 F.3d 818 (4th Cir.) (remand to agency when agency failed to address an issue)
Gonzalez v. Duenas-Alvarez, 549 U.S. 183 (2007) (realistic probability—not mere theoretical possibility—required to show statute covers non-generic conduct)
Moncrieffe v. Holder, 569 U.S. 184 (2013) (limits on using categorical approach and legal imagination)
Rice v. State, 311 Md. 116 (Md. 1987) (Maryland theft statute is a single consolidated offense; jury unanimity not required)