Marianne N. v. dcs/o.N./i.T./a.G.
CV-16-0259-PR
| Ariz. | Sep 25, 2017Background
- DCS moved to terminate Marianne N.’s parental rights after her children were found dependent; termination grounds included neglect, chronic drug abuse, and lengthy out-of-home placement.
- The juvenile court held an initial termination hearing (Marianne attended), set mediation and a pretrial conference for January 20, and a termination adjudication hearing for February 24; Marianne signed and received Form 3 that warned failure to appear could result in a finding of waiver and admission.
- Marianne did not appear at the January 20 mediation/pretrial; her counsel attempted contact; the court found she had notice and proceeded under Ariz. R.P. Juv. Ct. 64(C) to conduct a termination adjudication at that time, allowing testimony and cross-examination.
- Marianne called thirty minutes into the hearing seeking telephonic participation, claiming a date error on her copy of Form 3; the court denied participation and later terminated her parental rights after finding DCS proved statutory grounds and best interests.
- On appeal Marianne argued Rule 64(C) conflicts with A.R.S. § 8-863(C) (which authorizes default only if a parent “does not appear at the hearing”), raising a separation-of-powers challenge; the court of appeals upheld the rule as procedural. The Arizona Supreme Court granted review.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Ariz. R.P. Juv. Ct. 64(C) conflicts with A.R.S. § 8-863(C) and thus violates separation of powers by authorizing default for nonappearance at pretrial conferences (not just the termination adjudication) | Marianne: § 8-863(C) limits default to the termination hearing; Rule 64(C) cannot add substantive forfeiture rights for pretrial nonattendance | DCS: Rule 64(C) is procedural, within the Court’s rulemaking power, and can be harmonized with § 8-863(C); even if overlapping, the rule governs procedure | Majority: Rule 64(C) and § 8-863(C) can be harmonized; the rule does not enlarge or diminish statutory rights and permits converting a pretrial into a termination adjudication when parent fails to appear; affirmed termination |
Key Cases Cited
- Daou v. Harris, 139 Ariz. 353 (affirms that the Court controls procedural rules but cannot alter substantive statutory rights)
- Don L. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 193 Ariz. 556 (App. 1998) (juvenile court lacked authority to sever parental rights by default absent statute or rule)
- Adrian E. v. Ariz. Dept. of Econ. Sec., 215 Ariz. 96 (App. 2007) (interpreting Rule 64(C) as more than a notice provision in motion-initiated termination actions)
- Kenneth T. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 212 Ariz. 150 (App. 2006) (treatment of procedural mechanisms—default, summary judgment, trial—as procedural questions)
- State v. Nordstrom, 230 Ariz. 110 (2012) (de novo review of constitutional issues)