Maria Molina Salas v. Jp Morgan Chase Bank, N. A.
334 Ga. App. 274
Ga. Ct. App.2015Background
- Maria Molina Salas obtained a $304,800 refinance loan from Chase in 2007 and executed a Chase security deed; the deed’s parcel ID referenced Lot 9 but the attached legal description described Lot 6. Maria later defaulted and Chase pursued nonjudicial foreclosure; Plaintiffs sued to enjoin foreclosure and quiet title.
- Prior conveyances: Yvette originally owned the property (Lots 6–9); multiple quitclaim deeds were executed among Yvette, Maria, and a purported transferee David Lipps, with recording dates that created a recording-priority dispute.
- Chase paid off prior liens (AWL and a HELOC) as part of the 2007 loan and asserted it intended a first-priority lien on the residential lot (Lot 9).
- Chase moved for summary judgment on Plaintiffs’ claims and on its counterclaims (judgment on the note, reformation of the security deed, and declaratory relief). The trial court granted summary judgment to Chase and Fannie Mae and ruled for Chase on its counterclaims.
- On appeal the court affirmed reformation, reversed the declaratory-judgment ruling (due to nondisposition of an intervening interest holder), and reversed the monetary award on the suit-on-note counterclaim for lack of admissible proof of damages and fees; remanded for further proceedings.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether declaratory judgment could establish Chase’s reformed deed as a first‑priority lien against all Lots without joining David Lipps | Lipps holds a 50% intervening interest and was not made a party; his absence impairs his rights | Lipps’s unrecorded deed is subordinate because Maria recorded first | Reversed: Lipps may be an indispensable party; case returned to trial to allow joinder |
| Admissibility of Javorsky affidavit and attached bank records under OCGA § 24‑9‑902(11)/business‑records exception | Affidavit and records were not properly noticed/self‑authenticating and Javorsky’s credentials are suspect | Records are business records; Plaintiffs had actual notice and opportunity to challenge; affidavit lays foundation | Affirmed: trial court did not abuse discretion admitting the bank records via Javorsky affidavit |
| Whether evidence supported reformation of the security deed for mutual mistake (Lot 6 v. Lot 9) | Documents only show scrivener/attorney error, not mutual mistake by borrower | Closing documents (occupancy affidavit, appraisal, loan application, scrivener’s affidavit) show both parties intended Lot 9 | Affirmed: sufficient evidence of mutual mistake to reform deed to Lot 9 |
| Whether summary judgment awarding a specific damages amount on the promissory note (and statutory attorney fees) was supported by admissible proof | Plaintiffs consented to liability but did not consent to amount; damages not proven to reasonable certainty | Chase relied on affidavit and payoff exhibit to prove balance and charges | Reversed in part: liability consented, but amount and attorney fees lacked competent proof; remanded to determine proper damages and fees |
Key Cases Cited
- Thomas v. Henry County Water and Sewerage Auth., 317 Ga. App. 258 (2012) (recording‑priority rules and notice considerations in competing deeds)
- First Nat. Bank of Polk County v. Carr, 260 Ga. App. 439 (2003) (definition and proof required for reformation based on mutual mistake)
- Aames Funding Corp. v. Henderson, 275 Ga. App. 323 (2005) (reformation to reflect parties’ intent where record supports that both parties intended broader encumbrance)
- Nelson v. Hamilton State Bank, 331 Ga. App. 419 (2015) (plaintiff must prove damages with reasonable certainty to obtain judgment amount on summary judgment)
- Jaycee Atlanta Dev. LLC v. Providence Bank, 330 Ga. App. 322 (2014) (authentication requirement for writings and business‑records foundation)
- Ware v. Multibank 2009‑1 RES‑ADC Venture, LLC, 327 Ga. App. 245 (2014) (financial institution records are generally trustworthy under business‑records exception)