Maria Marble v. John Faelle
89 A.3d 830
R.I.2014Background
- On Dec. 28, 2007, Maria Marble was struck by a 2007 Dodge Charger registered to Hertz and driven by John Faelle; she sued Faelle and later added Hertz and the renter, Anthony Carroccio.
- Hertz moved for summary judgment, arguing lack of consent for Faelle’s operation and, alternatively, that the federal Graves Amendment (49 U.S.C. § 30106) shields it from vicarious liability.
- Hertz submitted a rental record, a rental agreement, an affidavit (Camerano) and other police documents; the rental record listed a 2008 Toyota Prius, not the Dodge Charger involved in the accident.
- The Camerano affidavit asserted Carroccio rented a 2007 Dodge Charger "pursuant to the rental record," but the submitted rental record was inconsistent and one version omitted the first page.
- Rhode Island statute § 31-33-7 makes vehicle registration prima facie evidence of consent; lack of consent is an affirmative defense for the owner to prove.
- Trial justice granted Hertz’s motion; Supreme Court reviewed de novo and reversed, finding genuine issues of material fact about consent and rental-period identity precluding summary judgment.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Hertz proved lack of consent so as to defeat § 31-33-7 prima facie evidence | Marble: documents are inconsistent; genuine factual dispute as to whether Hertz consented to Faelle driving | Hertz: rental record and terms limit authorized drivers to renter only, showing no consent | Court: denied — contradictions and ambiguities in Hertz’s submissions create material fact issues on consent |
| Whether Graves Amendment precludes vicarious liability of Hertz | Marble: Graves Amendment inapplicable or at least factual disputes exist about rental identity/period | Hertz: federal statute preempts state vicarious-liability rule, barring suit against owner | Court: denied summary judgment — factual dispute (rental record mismatch) prevents application at summary judgment; court did not decide preemption on merits |
| Whether Hertz’s affidavits and records suffice to establish facts for summary judgment | Marble: affidavits are drafted by counsel and records are inconsistent/altered; not sufficient | Hertz: submitted rental documents and affidavit to support factual showing | Court: denied — affidavits/records contained inconsistencies and omissions; cannot resolve at summary judgment |
| Whether this is a "rare and exceptional" case allowing owner to prove lack of consent as a matter of law | Marble: not rare; evidence ambiguous | Hertz: relied on prior precedent where similar contract terms resolved consent | Court: held not rare/exceptional here — material ambiguities require trial factfinding |
Key Cases Cited
- LaFratta v. Rhode Island Public Transit Authority, 751 A.2d 1281 (R.I. 2000) (rental agreement can provide proof of lack of consent when unambiguous)
- Pichardo v. Stevens, 55 A.3d 762 (R.I. 2012) (§ 31-33-7 prima facie evidence of consent remains in case; defendants rarely win lack-of-consent affirmative defense on summary judgment)
- Sullo v. Greenberg, 68 A.3d 404 (R.I. 2013) (standard of review for summary judgment — de novo, view evidence for nonmoving party)
- Sola v. Leighton, 45 A.3d 502 (R.I. 2012) (summary judgment appropriate only when no genuine issue of material fact remains)
- Kent v. Draper Soap Co., 63 A.2d 571 (R.I. 1949) (discussing the evidentiary weight of vehicle registration as prima facie proof of consent)