Maria Jauregui-Cardenas v. William Barr, 946 F.3d 1116

Maria Jauregui-Cardenas, a Mexican national in the U.S. since 1992, was convicted in July 2013 under California Penal Code § 114 for using false documents to conceal citizenship and sentenced to five years.
DHS issued a Notice to Appear and initiated removal; Jauregui-Cardenas applied for cancellation of removal under 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b).
An IJ found her § 114 conviction categorically an aggravated felony under INA § 1101(a)(43)(P) and denied cancellation; the BIA affirmed and alternatively held the statute was a categorical crime involving moral turpitude (CIMT).
The Ninth Circuit reviewed de novo, applying the Taylor/Descamps categorical approach to compare the elements of CPC § 114 with the federal aggravated-felony and CIMT definitions.
The court identified § 114’s elements as: (1) use, (2) of a false document, (3) to conceal citizenship/alien status, (4) with specific intent, and determined the statute is overbroad and indivisible.
The court concluded § 114 is neither an aggravated felony under the federal document-fraud statute nor categorically a CIMT, reversed the BIA, and remanded for further proceedings.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether CPC § 114 is an aggravated felony matching 18 U.S.C. § 1546(a) (document fraud)	§ 114 is broader because it covers use of any false document (e.g., fake DMV IDs) not limited to the enumerated federal documents	§ 114 involves use of false documents to conceal status and thus categorically matches the federal document-fraud aggravated felony	Court held § 114 is overbroad and indivisible and therefore is not a categorical aggravated felony under INA § 1101(a)(43)(P)
Whether CPC § 114 is a categorical crime involving moral turpitude (CIMT)	§ 114 requires specific intent to conceal status but does not require intent to defraud or to obtain a benefit, so it is not necessarily a CIMT	Use of a false document to conceal status reflects fraudulent or depraved conduct and thus is a CIMT	Court held § 114 does not necessarily involve intent to defraud or obtaining a benefit and is overbroad; it is not categorically a CIMT

Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575 (1990) (establishing the categorical approach)
Descamps v. United States, 570 U.S. 254 (2013) (limits use of modified categorical approach to divisible statutes)
Moncrieffe v. Holder, 569 U.S. 184 (2013) (state statute must be fully encompassed by generic federal offense)
Nunez v. Holder, 594 F.3d 1124 (9th Cir. 2010) (deference to BIA conclusions only to the "power to persuade")
United States v. Wei Lin, 738 F.3d 1082 (9th Cir. 2013) (18 U.S.C. § 1546(a) covers only enumerated documents)
Blanco v. Mukasey, 518 F.3d 714 (9th Cir. 2008) (fraudulent intent required for an offense to qualify as a fraudulent CIMT)
Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015) (vagueness principles relevant to categorical crime definitions)