Maria Hernandez v. Williams, Zinman & Parham Pc
2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 13242
9th Cir.2016Background
- Maria Hernandez defaulted on an auto loan; initial collection letter sent by Thunderbird Collection Specialists, Inc. (a debt collector) went unanswered.
- Thunderbird retained law firm Williams, Zinman & Parham PC (WZP), which sent Hernandez a December 2011 collection letter as WZP’s first communication; WZP identified itself as a debt collector but did not include required § 1692g(a) validation-content about written disputes or written requests for original-creditor info.
- Hernandez sued WZP under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA), alleging violations of § 1692g(a) (failure to provide required validation notice content); parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment.
- WZP argued it owed no § 1692g(a) duties because Thunderbird’s earlier letter was the statutory “initial communication”; district court agreed and granted summary judgment for WZP.
- The Ninth Circuit reviewed de novo and considered whether “the initial communication” means the first communication ever about a debt or the first communication by each debt collector that attempts to collect the debt.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Does “the initial communication” in 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(a) mean the first communication ever about a debt or the first communication by each debt collector? | Hernandez: § 1692g(a) requires each debt collector to send the validation notice within five days of that collector’s first communication about the debt. | WZP: The phrase refers to the single, first communication about the debt (by any party); only that communication triggers § 1692g(a). | The Ninth Circuit held § 1692g(a) requires any debt collector — first or subsequent — to send the validation notice within five days of that collector’s initial communication. |
Key Cases Cited
- Heintz v. Jenkins, 514 U.S. 291 (recognizing that attorneys who regularly collect consumer debts are debt collectors under the FDCPA)
- Ron Pair Enters. v. United States, 489 U.S. 235 (statutory text governs when meaning is plain)
- King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480 (use statutory structure and purpose to resolve ambiguities)
- TRW, Inc. v. Andrews, 534 U.S. 19 (avoid statutory interpretations that render provisions superfluous)
- Camacho v. Bridgeport Fin., Inc., 430 F.3d 1078 (discussing § 1692g’s purpose to give consumers time to dispute debts)
- BF Goodrich Aerospace Aerostructures Grp. v. Int’l Ass’n of Machinists, 387 F.3d 1046 (consider statutory context; avoid reading words in isolation)