Maria Durden v. United States
2013 U.S. App. LEXIS 23352
| 4th Cir. | 2013Background
- Pernell, a U.S. Army specialist, raped Maria Durden at her Fort Bragg home on December 13, 2009; Durden filed an FTCA claim alleging Army negligence for failing to protect her.
- The district court dismissed for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction; on appeal, Durden argues the complaint states a negligent-duty claim under North Carolina law and is not barred by the FTCA’s intentional-tort exception.
- Durden asserts three theories of duty: (1) landlord liability for a foreseeable third-party attack, (2) a special relationship requiring protection of Durden, and (3) a voluntarily assumed duty from monitoring Pernell after his civilian confinement.
- The government contends the allegations fail to show a breach of duty under North Carolina law, and the FTCA’s intentional-tort exception bars the claim; the court reviews facial challenges to jurisdiction.
- The court ultimately affirms the district court’s grant of summary judgment to the government, holding no duty was breached under NC law and that the § 2680(h) exception does not bar the suit entirely.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the Army owed Durden a duty under NC law and breached it. | Durden argues the Army breached a landlord or special-relationship duty. | The Army contends no NC duty was breached; foreseeability and control theories fail. | No breach found; no applicable duty established. |
| Whether the alleged duty to monitor Pernell after release constitutes a voluntarily assumed duty. | The Army undertook monitoring duties and breached them. | Monitoring did not create a legally cognizable duty to Durden independent of Pernell’s status. | Voluntary undertaking duty not established. |
| Whether the Army’s knowledge of Pernell’s propensity gained through employment affects FTCA liability under § 2680(h). | Knowledge derived from employment should not bar liability. | Knowledge tied to employment could shield the government under the intentional-tort exception. | Knowledge does not automatically bar FTCA claims; district court’s alternative basis was erroneous. |
| Whether discovery could affect the merits given intertwined jurisdictional and merits questions. | Durden sought discovery to prove negligence theories. | Discovery would not alter the outcome of the legal theories. | Court did not abuse discretion; discovery unnecessary to resolve merits. |
Key Cases Cited
- Connelly v. Family Inns of Am., Inc., 540 S.E.2d 38 (N.C. Ct. App. 2000) (foreseeability factors in landlord liability)
- Davenport v. D.M. Rental Props., Inc., 718 S.E.2d 188 (N.C. Ct. App. 2011) (foreseeability depends on location, type, and amount of prior crime)
- Murrow v. Daniels, 364 S.E.2d 392 (N.C. 1988) (prior crimes of same type relevant for foreseeability)
- Rivanna Trawlers Unlimited v. Thompson Trawlers, Inc., 840 F.2d 236 (4th Cir. 1988) (jurisdictional and merits intertwined; treatment as merits issue)
- Kerns v. United States, 585 F.3d 187 (4th Cir. 2009) (jurisdictional challenges may assume truth of allegations for facial review)
- Sheridan v. United States, 487 U.S. 392 (1988) (FTCA intentional-tort exception; knowledge of tortfeasor’s status not dispositive)
- Scadden v. Holt, 733 S.E.2d 90 (N.C. Ct. App. 2012) (special relationship requires real custody/authority to control)
- Lumsden v. United States, 555 F. Supp. 2d 580 (E.D.N.C. 2008) (duty may arise from knowledge of dangerous propensities; not controlling here)