MARIA CORTEZ-STARICCO VS. PIER VILLAGE LWAG VS. MAIK COMPANY MARIA CORTEZ-STARICCO VS. GREGORY MAIK A/K/A MAIK COMPANY(L-3412-12 AND L-2831-13, MONMOUTH COUNTY AND STATEWIDE)
A-4319-14T3
| N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. | May 22, 2017Background
- On July 26, 2011, plaintiff Marie Cortez‑Staricco was rollerblading in the Pier Village complex when the underground Phase II sprinkler system activated between ~8:00–8:30 a.m., spraying mulch into her wheels and causing her to fall and break her wrist.
- The sprinkler system was controlled by a single digital control box in a locked pump room; on‑site maintenance (PV/Applied) staff had keys and knew how to manually override the timer. An outside contractor, Gregory Maik (Maik Company), performed seasonal start/stop and repairs and had access when servicing the system.
- Testimony from defendants’ witnesses agreed the system should not have run at that time and would only run off‑schedule if manually activated. Plaintiff’s engineer offered possible causes and concluded manual activation by either PV/Applied or Maik was plausible.
- Plaintiff sued PV and Applied (property owner/manager) and Maik (contractor). The trial court granted summary judgment for all defendants, reasoning expert testimony was required and plaintiff could not show exclusive control.
- The Appellate Division reversed, holding res ipsa loquitur applied and that control could be shared among multiple defendants, so summary judgment was improper and the case must go to a jury.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether res ipsa loquitur applies | The unexpected daytime activation of a sprinkler that should not have been running bespeaks negligence; jurors can infer negligence without expert proof | The sprinkler system is too complex; expert testimony is required to show negligence and causation | Res ipsa applies — the occurrence (sprinkler running at an improper time) reasonably bespeaks negligence and can be decided by jurors without mandatory expert proof (Jerista principle) |
| Whether plaintiff must show exclusive control by a single defendant | Control could have been in either or both defendants; plaintiff need not prove which one at summary judgment | Res ipsa requires exclusive control by a single defendant, so plaintiff cannot proceed against multiple defendants | Exclusive control need not be singular; res ipsa can be invoked against multiple defendants where control may have been in either or both (Allendorf/Meny line) |
| Whether expert testimony was a prerequisite to survive summary judgment | Not required here because the facts (system should not run then; only manual activation could cause it) are within common knowledge | Expert required to explain system operation and standard of care | Expert testimony may be useful but is not mandatory where common knowledge and the record allow a jury inference of negligence (Jerista) |
| Whether summary judgment was proper | Plaintiff: no — disputed material facts and res ipsa entitle her to a jury | Defendants: yes — no admissible evidence proving negligence or exclusive control | Summary judgment improper; case remanded for trial (jury to decide causation and fault) |
Key Cases Cited
- Jerista v. Murray, 185 N.J. 175 (N.J. 2005) (res ipsa may be applied to complex instrumentality where common knowledge supports an inference of negligence)
- Myrlak v. Port Auth. of N.Y. and N.J., 157 N.J. 84 (N.J. 1999) (plaintiff need only show it is more probable than not that defendant's negligence was a proximate cause)
- Brill v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 142 N.J. 520 (N.J. 1995) (summary judgment standard; view evidence most favorably to non‑moving party)
- Szalontai v. Yazbo's Sports Café, 183 N.J. 386 (N.J. 2005) (res ipsa is evidentiary rule governing adequacy of negligence proof)
- Rose v. Port of N.Y. Auth., 61 N.J. 129 (N.J. 1972) (res ipsa applied despite expert testimony not pinpointing exact mechanical failure)
- Allendorf v. Kaiserman Enters., 266 N.J. Super. 662 (App. Div. 1993) (res ipsa applicable against both owner and maintenance contractor)
