Maria Brandon v. Maricopa County
849 F.3d 837
| 9th Cir. | 2017Background
- Maria Brandon, a longtime Maricopa County civil litigator, spoke to an Arizona Republic reporter while employed by a county-created Special Litigation office about a settlement in a sheriff-department brutality case; her brief comment was published.
- Special Litigation was later disbanded; Brandon was rehired by the Maricopa County Attorney’s Office (MCAO) and fired during a probationary period after an office altercation.
- County risk-management officials (Wilson and Armfield) had asked the MCAO to reassign Brandon from risk-management cases because they viewed her press comment as unprofessional and a liability.
- Brandon sued the County and officials for First Amendment retaliation (42 U.S.C. § 1983), due process, wrongful termination (state law), and tortious interference with contract (against Wilson and Armfield).
- A jury found for Brandon on the First Amendment claim (nominal damages) and for tortious interference (substantial damages). The district court denied JMOL and awarded attorney’s fees.
- The Ninth Circuit reversed: (1) the tortious-interference verdict against the risk managers was improper as a matter of Arizona law because their conduct was a permissible protection of a legally protected client interest, and (2) Brandon’s press comment was made pursuant to her official duties as county counsel and thus not protected speech under Garcetti, so the First Amendment verdict was reversed; the fee award was vacated.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Wilson and Armfield improperly tortiously interfered with Brandon’s employment contract | Wilson and Armfield’s requests to reassign cases were improper interference causing loss of contract rights | Their requests were a lawful, good-faith assertion of the County’s (client’s) protected interest in competent counsel | Reversed: as a matter of law their conduct was not “improper” under Arizona tort law — they represented the County (client) protecting a legitimate interest |
| Whether Brandon’s statement to the press was protected citizen speech under the First Amendment | Brandon contends her spoken comment to a reporter was citizen speech on matters of public concern and not within her official duties | Defendants assert the comment related to a case she represented the County on and was made in her role as county counsel, so Garcetti bars protection | Reversed: court holds the comment fell within Brandon’s official duties as county attorney (fiduciary duty of loyalty and representation), so Garcetti precludes First Amendment protection |
| Whether the district court properly denied JMOL/new trial on the First Amendment and interference claims | Brandon argues sufficient evidence supported jury findings and credibility choices | Defendants argue no reasonable jury could find impropriety or protected speech given the record and legal duties | Reversed: JMOL should have been granted for defendants on both claims; jury verdicts unsupported as a matter of law |
| Whether attorney’s fees awarded under § 1988 survive after reversal of the § 1983 judgment | Brandon argues she was the prevailing party and entitled to fees | Defendants argue no prevailing party remains after reversal | Fees vacated because there is no successful § 1983 claim on which to base the award |
Key Cases Cited
- Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410 (speech pursuant to official duties is not protected by the First Amendment)
- Dahlia v. Rodriguez, 735 F.3d 1060 (9th Cir. en banc) (practical inquiry — chain of command, subject matter, supervisor contravention — to determine whether speech is official)
- Lane v. Franks, 134 S. Ct. 2369 (citizen speech based on information obtained at work can be protected)
- Wagenseller v. Scottsdale Mem’l Hosp., 147 Ariz. 370 (Arizona test: interference must be “improper”; factors from Restatement § 767)
- Snow v. W. Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 152 Ariz. 27 (discusses when assertion of a legally protected interest makes interference proper)
- McReynolds v. Short, 115 Ariz. 166 (App. 1977) (privilege to interfere when bona fide exercise of one’s own rights or equal/superior interest)
- State Farm Mut. Ins. Co. v. St. Joseph’s Hosp., 107 Ariz. 498 (clients have absolute right to terminate attorney-client relationship)