Margie Brandon v. Sage Corporation
808 F.3d 266
5th Cir.2015Background
- Brandon sued Sage for racial discrimination, wrongful termination, retaliation, and related state-law claims; district court granted Sage summary judgment.
- Brandon was San Antonio Campus Director; Blake supervised her, reporting to Aversa, Sage’s President; Campanian was a high-level director with broader authority.
- Campanian supervised Eure, a hire Brandon had approved; Campanian stated Sage did not hire cross-gender people and threatened discipline for Eure’s hire.
- Campanian reduced Eure’s hours and Brandon’s pay, allegedly by 50%, for hiring Eure; Brandon questioned the decision and told Aversa; Campanian claimed it was Sage’s order.
- Brandon resigned and Eure also resigned after Campanian’s conduct; Aversa later apologized and said Campanian lacked authority to cut pay or hours.
- EEOC found reasonable cause that discrimination and retaliation occurred; district court treated the pay-cut threat as not an adverse action for retaliation purposes.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the pay-cut threat was an adverse action for retaliation | Brandon argues the threat dissuaded retaliation claims. | Sage contends the threat was not a material adverse action. | No adverse action; threat not enough to dissuade a reasonable employee. |
| Whether Campanian was Sage's agent to bind Brandon's employment | Brandon argues Campanian’s authority makes Sage liable. | Sage contends Campanian lacked authority to hire/fire or alter terms. | Sage not vicariously liable; Campanian lacked authority over employment conditions. |
| Whether Brandon established a prima facie retaliation claim given causation | Brandon asserts protected activity and causal link via Campanian’s actions. | Sage argues no causal connection due to lack of final adverse action. | Prima facie element not satisfied; no material adverse action occurred. |
Key Cases Cited
- Burlington Northern Santa Fe Ry. v. White, 548 U.S. 53 (U.S. 2006) (adverse action in retaliation context; standard of material adversity)
- Jones v. Flagship International, 793 F.2d 714 (5th Cir. 1986) (opposition protected even if discriminations targeted at others)
- Long v. Eastfield College, 88 F.3d 300 (5th Cir. 1996) (agency considerations for employer liability in retaliation)
- Ackel v. National Communications, Inc., 339 F.3d 376 (5th Cir. 2003) (proxy/agency liability for supervisors in harassment context)
- Piazza’s Seafood World, LLC v. Odom, 448 F.3d 744 (5th Cir. 2006) (summary judgment evidentiary standard; burden shifting)
- Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 133 S. Ct. 2517 (U.S. 2013) (but-for causation standard for Title VII retaliation claims)
- Raggs v. Miss. Power & Light Co., 278 F.3d 463 (5th Cir. 2002) (elements of a prima facie retaliation case)
- Jones v. Flagship Int'l, 793 F.2d 714 (5th Cir. 1986) (protected activity can be opposing discriminatory practices)