Margaret Pulera v. Town of Richmond, 2017 WI 61

Rock County Highway Dept. altered an intersection on the Rock–Walworth county line and discontinued two roads without prior town highway orders; towns later retroactively approved the changes at a joint meeting on Sept. 9, 2014.
Richmond (Walworth) recorded its highway order Oct. 3, 2014; Johnstown (Rock) recorded its highway order Nov. 3, 2014.
Pulera filed certiorari petitions: Nov. 3, 2014 (Walworth) and Dec. 1, 2014 (Rock), challenging the towns' recorded highway orders.
Both circuit courts dismissed Pulera's petitions as untimely, but used different triggering events (town vote or actual notice) to start the 30-day statutory period.
The court of appeals certified the question to the Wisconsin Supreme Court: what event triggers the 30-day filing period under Wis. Stat. § 68.13(1) for town highway orders (as applied with § 82.15)?
The Supreme Court reversed the dismissals and held the 30-day period begins on the date the highway order is recorded with the county register of deeds; Pulera’s petitions were therefore timely.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
When does the 30-day certiorari period under Wis. Stat. § 68.13(1) begin for a town highway order under § 82.15?	Starts when the highway order is recorded with the register of deeds (gives final form and public notice).	Starts when the town board votes/adopts the order (vote is the decisive public action).	Begins on the date the highway order is recorded by the register of deeds.
Does actual notice to an individual trigger the 30-day period?	(argued by some) Receipt by individuals should start the clock.	Towns: actual receipt by individuals varies and is unreliable.	Rejected as primary trigger; recording supplies a single, ascertainable trigger and accords with statutory scheme.
Must a petitioner have been a party to the underlying proceeding to file within 30 days?	Pulera argued highway-order aggrievement permits certiorari under § 82.15 even if not a formal party.	Towns contended § 68.13(1) refers to a party to a proceeding.	Court treated persons aggrieved by highway orders as entitled to seek certiorari under § 82.15/§ 68.13 and tied the 30-day clock to recording.
Should courts adopt a uniform, administrable trigger date?	Recording supplies a date‑certain, public, and final instrument suitable for triggering the deadline.	Vote or actual notice produce variable or attendance‑dependent triggers.	Yes — recording provides clarity and minimizes disputes; court adopts it while urging legislative clarification.

Kalal v. Circuit Court for Dane Cty., 271 Wis. 2d 633 (statutory interpretation principles)
Dawson v. Town of Jackson, 336 Wis. 2d 318 (noting ambiguity in § 68.13(1) re: highway orders)
Marder v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Wis. Sys., 286 Wis. 2d 252 (standard of review for statutory interpretation)
Ramsthal Advertising Agency v. Energy Miser, Inc., 90 Wis. 2d 74 (written order required for appeal)
Helmrick v. Helmrick, 95 Wis. 2d 554 (appealable order must be in writing)