Margaret Grotts v. Kilolo Kijakazi
27 F.4th 1273
7th Cir.2022Background
- Margaret Grotts applied for DIB and SSI on August 26, 2009, alleging disability (bipolar/depression, cognitive and functional limits) for a closed period Jan 1, 2007–Dec 9, 2014.
- Treatments included long‑term care from APRN Janet Merrell and counseling from Tina Otto and Mikaella Walker; those providers opined marked/extreme limitations and frequent absences/decompensation.
- Two state agency psychologists (Drs. Cremerius and Brister) reviewed the record and found only moderate mental limitations; they concluded Grotts could perform work within a restricted range.
- The ALJ (after four prior remands in the agency/district‑court history) gave great weight to the state‑agency opinions, discounted the APRN/therapist opinions, found Grotts capable of light work with restrictions, and denied benefits; the district court affirmed.
- On appeal Grotts argued error in (1) rejecting treating providers’ opinions, (2) improperly evaluating her subjective symptom statements, and (3) an unsupported RFC; the Seventh Circuit affirmed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether ALJ erred by not giving controlling weight to Merrell, Otto, Walker | These were treating sources whose opinions deserved controlling/great weight under the treating‑physician framework | For claims filed in 2009 the APRN and counselors were not "acceptable medical sources"/treating sources; their opinions are considered under the lesser §404.1527(f) standard and the ALJ adequately explained why she discounted them | Affirmed: providers were not treating "acceptable medical sources" for this claim; ALJ met §404.1527(f) articulation requirements |
| Whether ALJ improperly relied on state‑agency psychologists | Cremerius/Brister misread or overlooked record evidence; their opinions insufficient to override treating providers | State‑agency psychologists are ‘‘highly qualified’’; ALJ reasonably evaluated §404.1527(c) factors and substantial evidence supports giving their opinions great weight | Affirmed: ALJ permissibly credited the state‑agency opinions and provided adequate reasons |
| Whether ALJ failed to evaluate subjective symptom testimony and RFC adequately | ALJ cherry‑picked favorable facts, ignored many treatment notes, and underassessed intensity/persistence of symptoms, so RFC is unsupported | ALJ considered required factors (medical evidence, treatment/response, activities, return to work), noted inconsistencies, and tied RFC to objective evidence and the reviewing psychologists’ opinions | Affirmed: credibility and RFC determinations were reasoned, supported by substantial evidence |
Key Cases Cited
- Gedatus v. Saul, 994 F.3d 893 (7th Cir. 2021) (standard of review and ALJ fact‑finding)
- Biestek v. Berryhill, 139 S. Ct. 1148 (2019) (definition of substantial evidence)
- Karr v. Saul, 989 F.3d 508 (7th Cir. 2021) (requirements for weighing treating physician opinions)
- Ketelboeter v. Astrue, 550 F.3d 620 (7th Cir. 2008) (review of ALJ weight given to medical opinions)
- Winsted v. Berryhill, 923 F.3d 472 (7th Cir. 2019) (who qualifies as an acceptable medical source)
- Pierce v. Colvin, 739 F.3d 1046 (7th Cir. 2014) (sufficiency of ALJ explanation when discounting non‑acceptable medical source opinions)
- Zoch v. Saul, 981 F.3d 597 (7th Cir. 2020) (courts must defer to ALJ reasoned weighing of evidence)
- Simila v. Astrue, 573 F.3d 503 (7th Cir. 2009) (ALJ may consider daily activities to evaluate symptom claims)
- Deborah M. v. Saul, 994 F.3d 785 (7th Cir. 2021) (credibility review standard — not patently wrong)
- Reynolds v. Kijakazi, 25 F.4th 470 (7th Cir. 2022) (linking RFC to objective evidence)