Margaret Froby v. Clark County School District
669 F. App'x 903
| 9th Cir. | 2016Background
- Margaret Froby was principal for inmate classes employed by Clark County School District at Florence McClure Women’s Correctional Center until August 2011.
- Froby sued under Title VII, alleging a sexually hostile work environment caused by NDOP Lieutenant Robert Hendrix’s conduct.
- Hendrix was not Froby’s supervisor; many complained-of acts involved his treatment of the education program or inmates, not direct sexualized conduct.
- Froby identified six incidents over nearly two years (e.g., denying visitor-room access, arguing about inmates, angry voicemail, removing inmate workers and yelling).
- Froby pointed to one gendered remark (calling the mother of his child a “bitch”); otherwise allegations lacked sex-specific conduct or evidence of differential treatment of men.
- The district court granted summary judgment for the District; the Ninth Circuit affirmed, finding the record insufficient to show severe or pervasive sex-based harassment or comparative treatment evidence.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Hendrix’s conduct created a sexually hostile work environment under Title VII | Froby argued Hendrix’s bullying and six incidents produced an abusive environment because of her sex | District argued conduct was not sexual or severe/pervasive and Hendrix was not her supervisor; no evidence of sex-based treatment differences | Court held conduct was not sufficiently sexual, severe, or pervasive to alter working conditions; summary judgment affirmed |
| Whether non–sex-specific offensive conduct can support Title VII without comparative evidence | Froby relied on circumstantial inference that behavior targeted her as a woman | District argued most conduct was non-sex-specific and isolated, so Title VII inapplicable absent sex-based motive or differences | Court held non-sex-specific conduct insufficient here because record lacked evidence of qualitative/quantitative differences by sex |
| Whether isolated incidents over time can satisfy the severe or pervasive standard | Froby argued the cumulative six incidents over ~2 years were enough | District argued incidents were isolated, not severe or pervasive | Court held incidents individually and collectively were not severe or pervasive to create an abusive environment |
| Whether absence of evidence about treatment of male employees permits an inference of sex-based discrimination | Froby sought to rely on EEOC v. NEA precedent to infer sex-based effect | District emphasized no record evidence about male employees or differential treatment | Court held absence of comparative evidence precluded permissible inference of sex-based harassment; EEOC v. NEA inapplicable |
Key Cases Cited
- Reza v. Pearce, 806 F.3d 497 (9th Cir. 2015) (summary judgment nonmovant burden to show a triable issue)
- United States v. Shumway, 199 F.3d 1093 (9th Cir. 1999) (standard for drawing inferences in favor of the respondent on summary judgment)
- Kortan v. Cal. Youth Auth., 217 F.3d 1104 (9th Cir. 2000) (elements for hostile work environment under Title VII)
- Pavon v. Swift Trans. Co., 192 F.3d 902 (9th Cir. 1999) (hostile work environment framework)
- Arizona ex rel. Horne v. Geo Grp., Inc., 816 F.3d 1189 (9th Cir. 2016) (sexual harassment must be sexual in nature but need not be motivated by sexual desire)
- EEOC v. Nat’l Educ. Ass’n, Alaska, 422 F.3d 840 (9th Cir. 2005) (comparative evidence can support inference of sex-based differences in harassment)
- Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75 (1998) (harassing conduct need not be motivated by sexual desire to be sex discrimination)
- Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775 (1998) (Title VII is not a general civility code for the workplace)