Margaret Cramer v. National Casualty Company, 690 F. App'x 135

Margaret Cramer, an EMT employed by St. Matthews Ambulance, was struck by an underinsured motorist while standing on the shoulder of a road about eight feet from her parked ambulance; she had activated the ambulance's emergency lights and exited to check on a nearby rear-end crash.
Cramer said she was returning to the ambulance to radio dispatch and notify her employer when struck; National Casualty (insurer) denied underinsured motorist benefits because she was not "occupying" the insured vehicle as defined by the policy.
The policy defined "occupying" as "in, upon, getting in, on, out or off" an insured vehicle.
Cramer sued for a declaratory judgment in federal court (case removed by insurer; claims against the tortfeasor severed and remanded); the district court granted summary judgment for Cramer, finding she was "getting in."
The Fourth Circuit reviewed de novo and reversed, holding Cramer was not "occupying" the vehicle under the policy or South Carolina law because she was separated from the ambulance by a lane of traffic and had not begun to cross or make physical contact with the vehicle.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether Cramer was "occupying" the insured vehicle when struck	Cramer was "getting in"—she intended to return and was taking actions reasonably associated with getting in	She was too far from the vehicle (separated by traffic) and had not begun to enter or contact the vehicle	Reversed district court: Cramer was not "occupying" the vehicle
Whether subjective intent alone satisfies "getting in"	Intent to get in plus some preparatory action suffices	Intent alone is insufficient without physical acts reasonably associated with getting in	Court: Intent is not dispositive; physical relationship required
Whether statutory definition of "use" (S.C. Code) extends coverage	Argued policy fails to meet statutory extension—Cramer was a user with consent	"Use" under statute requires transportation use; she was not using vehicle for transport	Court: Not using the vehicle for transportation; statute does not extend coverage here
Whether terms like "upon," "out," or "off" should be read independent of "getting"	These words should be read independently to cover people recently out of vehicle	South Carolina precedent requires physical contact for "upon" and does not broaden "out/off" to cover all	Court: Cannot sever; terms require physical connection or acts of entering/exiting

Whitmire v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 174 S.E.2d 391 (S.C. 1970) (held claimant struck within two or three feet while proceeding to shoulder was "alighting" and thus "occupying")
McAbee v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 152 S.E.2d 731 (S.C. 1967) ("occupying" requires some physical relationship to the insured vehicle)
USAA Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co. v. Clegg, 661 S.E.2d 791 (S.C. 2008) (insurance contracts construed by ordinary meaning; ambiguities construed for insured)
Bell v. Progressive Direct Ins. Co., 757 S.E.2d 399 (S.C. 2014) (courts should not expand policy coverage beyond plain language)
Peagler v. USAA Ins. Co., 628 S.E.2d 475 (S.C. 2006) ("use" of vehicle under statute limited to transportation purposes)