Margaret Byrd v. Kenneth Stubbs, 190 So. 3d 26

Byrd underwent a diagnostic colonoscopy in May 2004 and was followed by Dr. Kenneth Stubbs; diverticulosis was diagnosed and no immediate intervention was ordered.
On July 19 Byrd presented to the ER (Dr. Seki), was admitted under Dr. Stubbs, treated for acute gastroenteritis/sepsis symptoms, and discharged July 21 with instructions to notify Stubbs of setbacks.
Byrd returned to the ER July 23; Dr. Seki treated and discharged her without notifying Dr. Stubbs — the hospital/Dr. Seki later conceded that failure to notify was negligent.
On July 24 Byrd returned in worse condition (ileus, peritonitis); CT and emergency surgery disclosed ruptured abscesses and required a high-diverting colostomy performed by Dr. Thomas Weed.
Byrd sued Stubbs (Seki/hospital settled). At trial experts disputed causation: Byrd’s expert said Stubbs’s earlier care plus Seki’s negligence both contributed; Stubbs’s experts said Seki’s undisclosed failure was an independent, unforeseeable superseding cause.
Jury returned a defense verdict for Stubbs. On appeal Byrd contended (1) the court erred in giving a superseding-cause jury instruction because the evidence did not support it, and (2) the instruction misstated the law.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether evidence supported a superseding-cause instruction	Byrd: both Stubbs’s and Seki’s acts were proximate causes; Seki’s acts were not independent or unforeseeable	Stubbs: Seki’s failure to notify was an independent, unforeseeable intervening negligence that could supersede Stubbs’s conduct	Court: Evidence created a jury question; instruction was warranted (no abuse of discretion)
Whether the instruction misstated the law	Byrd: instruction improperly allowed acquittal of Stubbs even if both were substantial factors (argued post-trial)	Stubbs: instruction tracked Mississippi law and model language; defined superseding cause as independent and unforeseen act that is substantial factor	Court: objection to wording not raised at trial and thus waived; even if reviewed, instruction fairly stated law and was acceptable when read as a whole

Causey v. Sanders, 998 So. 2d 393 (Miss. 2008) (defines superseding intervening cause and discusses foreseeability)
Southland Mgmt. Co. v. Brown ex rel. Brown, 730 So. 2d 43 (Miss. 1998) (foreseeability limits superseding-cause defense)
Eckman v. Moore, 876 So. 2d 975 (Miss. 2004) (approving a superseding-cause instruction where intervening nursing negligence was at issue)
Entrican v. Ming, 962 So. 2d 28 (Miss. 2007) (intervening cause is closely tied to causation and is for the jury)
Mitchell v. Barnes, 96 So. 3d 771 (Miss. Ct. App. 2012) (instructions reviewed as a whole; defects not reversible if jury fairly instructed)
Young v. Guild, 7 So. 3d 251 (Miss. 2009) (party entitled to instruction if credible evidence supports it)