Marga Baker v. Macon Resources, Incorporated, 2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 7769

Baker, a 19-year caregiver for people with disabilities, sues Macon Resources for age discrimination after being fired over reporting abuse.
Macon Resources has a policy requiring reporting of abuse to a supervisor and, per state law, to the Office of the Inspector General (OIG).
Cross, a younger 39-year-old caregiver, was not fired but received a 3-day suspension for similar allegations; she was described by the director as having “direct” evidence of sexual abuse, whereas Baker witnessed physical abuse.
The district court granted summary judgment, holding Cross and Baker were not similarly situated because Cross allegedly failed to report only rumors while Baker witnessed abuse.
Baker alleges the director treated her more harshly due to age, asserting pretext through selective enforcement and inconsistencies in the reasons given for disciplining Baker vs. Cross.
The panel reverses and remands, holding that reasonable jurors could find Cross is a similarly situated employee and that pretext evidence exists.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Are Cross and Baker similarly situated for purposes of age discrimination?	Baker and Cross engaged in comparable misconduct under the same policy.	Cross’s conduct differed in kind (alleged rumors vs. witnessed abuse) and thus is not directly comparable.	Yes, Cross is sufficiently similar; jury could find comparable misconduct.
Did the record support a finding of pretext for the harsher treatment of Baker?	Inconsistencies and selective enforcement suggest pretext for age-based punishment.	Differences in witness status justify different disciplinary outcomes.	Yes, evidence of pretext could allow a jury to infer age bias.
Did the district court properly grant summary judgment on the prima facie case?	The elements can be satisfied with the similar-situations approach and pretext evidence.	The distinctions between Baker and Cross foreclose a prima facie case.	There is a genuine dispute; summary judgment was inappropriate.

McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (U.S. 1973) (establishes the set of McDonnell Douglas prima facie framework for discrimination cases)
Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133 (U.S. 2000) (proof that defendant’s explanation is unworthy of credence is probative of discrimination)
Coleman v. Donahoe, 667 F.3d 835 (7th Cir. 2012) (two employees’ misconduct with different outcomes may show pretext)
Chaney v. Plainfield Healthcare Ctr., 612 F.3d 908 (7th Cir. 2010) (selective enforcement or investigation can show pretext)
Hobgood v. Ill. Gaming Bd., 731 F.3d 635 (7th Cir. 2013) (reversal when record could support discrimination inference)