920 S.E.2d 17
S.C. Ct. App.2025Background
- Marcus Wright was tried for murder (and related drug/weapon counts). After the State rested he told the trial court he would "remain silent," defense rested, and the court began a charge conference.
- During the overnight recess Wright changed his mind and told counsel the next morning he wanted to testify; counsel informed the court but did not immediately move to reopen the record and the court denied reopening as the record was closed.
- The trial court explained it refused to reopen in part because allowing testimony after the court's charge-ruling risked the defendant tailoring testimony to obtain self-defense/voluntary manslaughter instructions; the jury convicted Wright and he was sentenced.
- On direct appeal the court found the trial court did not abuse discretion in refusing to reopen; Wright then sought post-conviction relief (PCR) alleging trial counsel was ineffective for failing to promptly move to reopen and asserting the denial was a structural error under State v. Rivera.
- The PCR court denied relief; the Court of Appeals affirmed, holding counsel was not deficient (reasonable to rely on Wright's prior waiver) and, even if deficient, Wright still had to prove Strickland prejudice under Weaver and failed to do so.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether counsel was ineffective for failing to promptly inform the court and move to reopen so Wright could testify | Wright: counsel was deficient for not protecting his fundamental right to testify; counsel should have moved immediately | State: counsel's conduct was reasonable because Wright had told the court he waived and counsel reasonably concluded the opportunity had passed | Counsel not deficient; decision to rely on defendant's prior statement was within reasonable professional norms |
| Whether the denial/preservation of the right to testify is a structural error that dispenses with Strickland prejudice (Rivera) in PCR | Wright: Rivera holds denial of the right to testify is structural so prejudice is presumed | State: Weaver requires a petitioner alleging ineffective assistance on collateral review to prove prejudice; Rivera governed direct review and does not eliminate Strickland/Weaver analysis here | Rivera applies to direct appeal structural-error claims; on collateral review petitioner must show Strickland prejudice under Weaver; Wright failed to show prejudice |
Key Cases Cited
- State v. Rivera, 402 S.C. 225, 741 S.E.2d 694 (S.C. 2013) (held trial court's improper refusal to permit defendant to testify is structural error on direct appeal)
- Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (U.S. 1984) (establishes two-prong ineffective-assistance test: deficiency and prejudice)
- Weaver v. Massachusetts, 582 U.S. 286 (U.S. 2017) (explains interaction between structural errors and Strickland on collateral review; prejudice typically required)
- State v. Wright, 416 S.C. 353, 785 S.E.2d 479 (Ct. App. 2016) (direct-appeal opinion upholding trial court's refusal to reopen record in this case)
- Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44 (U.S. 1987) (recognizes defendant's right to testify as fundamental to a personal defense)
- Luce v. United States, 469 U.S. 38 (U.S. 1984) (prejudice analysis complicated when courts cannot know defendant's unpresented testimony)
- United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. 140 (U.S. 2006) (counsel errors are not "complete" until prejudice shown)
- Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279 (U.S. 1991) (distinguishes structural errors from trial errors; structural errors are not subject to harmless-error analysis)