Marcus v. Staubs ex rel. Staubs, 736 S.E.2d 360

Single-car crash killed 14-year-old Samantha Staubs and injured 13-year-old Jessica Staubs; both were in a stolen, alcohol-driven vehicle driven by 14-year-old Misty Johnson who was intoxicated.
Petitioner Marcus allegedly helped procure alcohol for the minors; Woodward purchased four 40-ounce malt liquors while Marcus was present but did not exit the vehicle.
The trial court granted summary judgment finding Marcus negligent under statutory and common-law theories and that Jessica was not contributory negligent; Marcus appeals.
Nationwide settled after set-aside of default, agreeing to pay plaintiffs a fixed amount depending on liability verdict, and petitioned for summary judgment; the court proceeded to determine liability on the merits.
The Court remands for fact-finding because genuine issues of material fact remained about foreseeability, the existence of a duty, and the proper apportionment of fault; the trial court’s role as fact-finder was improperly bypassed.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Duty to protect minors from foreseeable harm	Staubs argues Marcus owed a duty by virtue of providing alcohol.	Marcus contends no duty to protect minors from third-party criminal acts.	Summary judgment inappropriate; duty disputed and for jury to resolve.
Proximate cause and intervening conduct	Respondent asserts foreseeability links Marcus to accident despite intervening criminal acts.	Marcus argues intervening acts break the chain of causation.	Factual questions for jury; summary judgment on proximate cause improper.
Social host liability	If Marcus provided alcohol to minors, liability could extend beyond traditional social host limits.	West Virginia recognizes limited social host liability; case not fit cleanly.	Not applicable under the facts; social host liability not established.
Propriety of summary judgment given disputed facts	No genuine issues of material fact exist; cross-motions support judgment.	Disputed material facts about knowledge, conduct, and foreseeability.	Court erred; issues of material fact preclude summary judgment; remand.

Overbaugh v. McCutcheon, 183 W.Va. 386, 396 S.E.2d 153 (1990) (1990) (special relationship and foreseeability exceptions to duty; summary judgment improper when facts disputed)
Miller v. Whitworth, 193 W.Va. 262, 455 S.E.2d 821 (1995) (1995) (duty exceptions for deliberate criminal conduct; general rule not absolute)
Strahin v. Cleavenger, 216 W.Va. 175, 603 S.E.2d 197 (2004) (2004) (duty conditioned on foreseeability; jury resolves foreseeability when facts disputed)
Aikens v. Debow, 208 W.Va. 486, 541 S.E.2d 576 (2000) (2000) (duty determination is generally legal, foreseeability factual; mix requires jury in disputed cases)
Anderson v. Moulder, 183 W.Va. 77, 394 S.E.2d 61 (1990) (1990) (violation of statute prima facie negligence; proximate cause required)
Sewell v. Gregory, 179 W.Va. 585, 371 S.E.2d 82 (1988) (1988) (foreseeability test for duty; general standard for negligence)
Fortner v. State, 182 W.Va. 345, 387 S.E.2d 812 (1989) (1989) (concerted action doctrine; defendant liable for accomplice conduct when foreseeably related to tort)
Wehner v. Weinstein, 191 W.Va. 149, 444 S.E.2d 27 (1994) (1994) (intervening and concurrent negligence framework)
Hartley v. Crede, 140 W.Va. 133, 82 S.E.2d 672 (1954) (1954) (negligence proximate cause standard)
Haddox v. Suburban Lanes, Inc., 176 W.Va. 744, 349 S.E.2d 910 (1986) (1986) (proximate cause and standard for negligence in WV)