Marcus Lee McCain v. State of Indiana, 140 N.E.3d 299

In August 2017 Marcus McCain shot and killed Marcel Harris in a Gary restaurant; surveillance video shows McCain grab a gun and shoot Harris at close range in the temple.
McCain was charged with murder; the State later added a firearm-enhancement alleging McCain used a firearm in the commission of murder.
At trial McCain asserted self‑defense and requested a voluntary‑manslaughter (sudden‑heat) instruction as a lesser‑included offense; the jury convicted him of voluntary manslaughter.
McCain waived a jury for the enhancement phase; the trial court found the firearm enhancement applied and entered judgment on it despite the charging information naming “murder.”
At sentencing the judge made repeated remarks disagreeing with the jury’s verdict and identified aggravators including that the killing was “cold‑blooded” and “callous,” then imposed 27 years for voluntary manslaughter plus an 18‑year firearm enhancement (45 years total).
On appeal the court upheld the firearm enhancement but concluded the judge improperly relied on an aggravator inconsistent with the jury’s sudden‑heat finding; the court revised the sentence to 25 years for voluntary manslaughter plus a 10‑year firearm enhancement (35 years) and remanded for resentencing accordingly.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether a firearm enhancement alleging use "in the commission of Murder" can be applied when defendant was convicted of voluntary manslaughter	The enhancement is valid because voluntary manslaughter qualifies under the enhancement statute and McCain had notice (he requested the lesser‑included instruction)	Charging variance: the enhancement accused commission of murder, and McCain was acquitted of murder, so the enhancement cannot apply	Affirmed: enhancement proper — voluntary manslaughter is a qualifying offense, defendant had notice, and he did not dispute the essential facts supporting the enhancement
Whether the trial court impermissibly enhanced sentence based on its disagreement with the jury (improper aggravator: "cold‑blooded/callous")	The court relied on valid aggravators and expressly stated it was not punishing McCain for murder; sentence was within statutory range	The judge enhanced sentence in part to compensate for disagreement with jury; finding that the killing was "cold‑blooded" contradicts jury’s sudden‑heat verdict and is an improper aggravator	Reversed in part: the court found the judge relied on an improper aggravator inconsistent with the jury’s verdict, exercised appellate revision under App. R. 7(B), and reduced the sentence to 25 + 10 = 35 years

Brantley v. State, 91 N.E.3d 566 (Ind. 2018) (explains voluntary manslaughter as murder mitigated by sudden heat and defines sudden heat)
Hamman v. State, 504 N.E.2d 276 (Ind. 1987) (trial judge may not enhance a sentence because of personal disagreement with jury verdict)
Gambill v. State, 436 N.E.2d 301 (Ind. 1982) (trial court improperly enhanced sentence to compensate for what judge believed was an erroneous jury verdict)
Wilson v. State, 458 N.E.2d 654 (Ind. 1984) (distinguishes Gambill; judge may express skepticism about jury verdict and rely on proper aggravators)
Windhorst v. State, 868 N.E.2d 504 (Ind. 2007) (appellate options when trial court relies on improper aggravator include remand or exercise of Rule 7(B) to revise sentence)
Blount v. State, 22 N.E.3d 559 (Ind. 2014) (variance between charging instrument and proof permits relief only if defendant was misled or left vulnerable to reprosecution)
Phelps v. State, 24 N.E.3d 525 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015) (trial court’s blatant disagreement with jury verdict can preclude remand for resentencing)