Marcus Anderson v. Brown Industries
614 F. App'x 415
11th Cir.2015Background
- Marcus Anderson, proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, sued Brown Industries for a hostile work environment under Title VII and § 1981; a jury returned verdict for Brown.
- After trial, Anderson moved under Rule 50(b) and Rule 59(a) for judgment as a matter of law and for a new trial; the district court denied those motions.
- Anderson sought to amend his complaint post-judgment to add a retaliatory hostile work environment claim based on Gowski v. Peake. The district court denied the untimely amendment.
- At trial Anderson testified and proposed instructions treating Josh Cox as his supervisor; after verdict he argued Cox was not a supervisor and attacked the Faragher–Ellerth defense.
- The district court applied judicial estoppel and found Anderson had waived the supervisory objection; the court therefore rejected his post-trial challenges.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether district court abused discretion by denying untimely motion to amend complaint to add retaliatory hostile work environment claim | Anderson: Gowski recognized the claim; he should be allowed to amend | Brown: Motion was filed after scheduling deadline with no good cause | Denied — no good cause; amendment untimely and properly refused |
| Whether judicial estoppel improperly barred Anderson from contesting Cox’s supervisory status | Anderson: change of position was based on intervening controlling law (Vance) and estoppel elements not met | Brown: Anderson previously took inconsistent sworn positions and would gain unfair advantage | Affirmed — estoppel proper; Vance was decided before trial so not intervening law |
| Whether Anderson preserved objection to Faragher–Ellerth jury instruction | Anderson: earlier pre-deliberation objection preserved the issue | Brown: Anderson repeatedly asserted Cox was supervisor and proposed instruction so he waived objection | Affirmed — waiver; prior conduct invited instruction |
| Whether there was sufficient evidence Cox was a supervisor (tangible employment action authority) | Anderson: no evidence Cox could take tangible employment actions; jury verdict unsupported | Brown: Plaintiff’s own testimony and proposed instructions invited supervisory finding | Affirmed — judicial estoppel and waiver bar challenge; invited error doctrine applies |
Key Cases Cited
- Gowski v. Peake, 682 F.3d 1299 (11th Cir.) (recognizing retaliatory hostile work environment claim under Title VII)
- Smith v. School Bd. of Orange Cnty., 487 F.3d 1361 (11th Cir.) (Rule 16 good-cause standard for amended pleadings after scheduling deadline)
- Oravec v. Sunny Isles Luxury Ventures, L.C., 527 F.3d 1218 (11th Cir.) (diligence required to satisfy Rule 16 good-cause)
- Robinson v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 595 F.3d 1269 (11th Cir.) (two-factor judicial estoppel test and requirement of intent)
- Burnes v. Pemco Aeroplex, 291 F.3d 1282 (11th Cir.) (judicial estoppel principles and abuse-of-discretion review)
- New Hampshire v. Maine, 532 U.S. 742 (Sup. Ct.) (factors informing judicial estoppel)
- Vance v. Ball State Univ., 133 S. Ct. 2434 (Sup. Ct.) (definition of supervisor for Faragher–Ellerth tangible employment action rule)
- Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775 (Sup. Ct.) (establishing employer affirmative defense to hostile work environment claims)
- Burlington Indus. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742 (Sup. Ct.) (partner decision with Faragher on employer defense to harassment claims)