Marcos Reis-Campos v. Martin Biter
2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 14519
| 9th Cir. | 2016Background
- In June 2004 Reis‑Campos (a Norteño) shot and killed MS‑13 member Luis Fuentes six times in Norteño territory; no weapon was recovered and Reis‑Campos claimed he acted in self‑defense.
- At trial the prosecution argued the killing was gang‑motivated to raise Reis‑Campos’ status; the jury convicted him of second‑degree murder with gang and firearm enhancements.
- After trial defense counsel received a prosecutor’s letter suggesting an informant had implicated Fuentes in a prior Daly City revenge killing; defense later uncovered that Sergeant Molina (prosecution’s investigator/gang expert) had participated in Operation Devil Horns and had learned from an informant about Fuentes’ violent acts.
- Defense argued the prosecution suppressed exculpatory/impeaching evidence (Brady) and allowed/failed to correct false testimony by Molina (Napue); defense also sought an evidentiary hearing.
- State courts denied relief on direct appeal and summary habeas; the district court denied federal habeas relief under AEDPA, concluding the withheld/false evidence was not material.
- Ninth Circuit affirmed, applying AEDPA deference and concluding that, although disclosure failures and Molina’s equivocal testimony were troubling, they were not material to undermine confidence in the verdict.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Brady suppression of evidence about Fuentes’ violent acts and informant identity | Suppressed evidence showing Fuentes ordered a Daly City revenge killing and that the informant was known to the prosecution would have bolstered self‑defense/impeached prosecution witnesses | State: evidence was not material; jury already heard about Fuentes’ violent status and trial outcome would not likely change | Denied under AEDPA: even assuming suppression, evidence was not sufficiently material to undermine confidence in the verdict |
| Napue (knowing use of false testimony) — Molina’s testimony denying knowledge of retaliation | Molina’s testimony was false; prosecution knew or should have corrected it, creating a Napue violation that could have affected the jury | State: no clear showing prosecutor knew of perjury; even if Molina lied, the falsehood was not material | Denied: petitioner failed to show clearly established law that officer knowledge imputes prosecutorial knowledge and, in any event, no reasonable likelihood the false testimony affected the verdict |
| Collective effect of Brady + Napue evidence | Combined suppressed/false evidence would meaningfully undercut prosecution’s portrayal of Fuentes and Molina, raising reasonable probability of different outcome | State: collective effect still insufficient given the record and jury’s exposure to Fuentes’ violent role and Reis‑Campos’ own testimony | Denied: applying Jackson framework, neither Napue alone nor combined Brady/Napue showed reasonable probability of different outcome |
| AEDPA/look‑through review and materiality standard | State court unreasonably applied Brady/Napue or made unreasonable factual findings | State: state appellate decision reasonably concluded nondisclosure/noncorrection was not material; deference under AEDPA limits relief | Denied: under AEDPA and "look through" to the last reasoned state decision, federal court cannot say state court unreasonably applied clearly established law or fact findings |
Key Cases Cited
- Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963) (suppression of favorable evidence violates due process when material)
- United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667 (1985) (evidence is material if disclosure creates a reasonable probability that outcome would differ)
- Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419 (1995) (Brady materiality assessed collectively and prosecution team knowledge imputable)
- Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264 (1959) (prosecutor must not knowingly present false testimony or allow false testimony to go uncorrected)
- Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263 (1999) (elements of Brady claim)
- Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86 (2011) (presumption that state court adjudicated claim on merits; AEDPA deference)
- Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 U.S. 170 (2011) (review under §2254(d)(1) limited to record before state court)
- Jackson v. Brown, 513 F.3d 1057 (9th Cir. 2008) (framework for analyzing combined Napue and Brady errors)
- Hayes v. Brown, 399 F.3d 972 (9th Cir. 2005) (Napue standard explained)