Marco Corona-Contreras v. Steven Gruel
2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 9196
| 9th Cir. | 2017Background
- Contreras sued his former immigration attorney Gruel in California state court for breach of contract and legal malpractice; complaint alleged Contreras lived in San Lorenzo but did not state citizenship.
- Nearly 11 months after the state complaint was filed, Gruel removed the action to federal court asserting diversity jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a).
- Contreras did not file a motion to remand or otherwise object to the removal; about three months after removal the parties filed a joint case management statement indicating no jurisdictional disputes.
- At a September 2, 2015 case management conference the district court sua sponte concluded removal was untimely under § 1446(b) and orally ordered remand; a written order remanded pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c).
- The Ninth Circuit considered whether the district court had authority to sua sponte remand for a procedural defect when the plaintiff failed to timely move to remand.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether a district court may sua sponte remand based on a procedural removal defect (timeliness) when plaintiff did not move to remand | Contreras argued the removal was untimely under § 1446(b) and remand was proper | Gruel argued procedural defects are waivable and without a timely remand motion the court lacked authority to remand | The court held the district court exceeded its authority: procedural defects require a timely motion to remand under § 1447(c), so sua sponte remand was improper |
Key Cases Cited
- Smith v. Mylan Inc., 761 F.3d 1042 (9th Cir. 2014) (procedural removal defects are waivable; remand for such defects requires a timely motion)
- Kelton Arms Condo. Owners Ass’n, Inc. v. Homestead Ins. Co., 346 F.3d 1190 (9th Cir. 2003) (district court lacks authority to sua sponte remand for procedural defects)
- Lively v. Wild Oats Mkts., Inc., 456 F.3d 933 (9th Cir. 2006) (§ 1447(d) bars review only if district court had authority under § 1447(c))
- Fristoe v. Reynolds Metals Co., 615 F.2d 1209 (9th Cir. 1980) (removal time limits are procedural, not jurisdictional; defects may be waived)
- Harris v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 425 F.3d 689 (9th Cir. 2005) (construction of § 1446(b) regarding when removal windows begin)
- In re Allstate Ins. Co., 8 F.3d 219 (5th Cir. 1993) (distinguishing procedural formalities from the court’s concern for jurisdictional prerequisites)