Marcie A. Beistline and William C. Beistline v. Bruce M. Footit, and Banner Health Inc., D/B/A Fairbanks Memorial Hospital
485 P.3d 39
Alaska2021Background
- Feb 2016: Marcie Beistline admitted to Fairbanks Memorial Hospital with confusion, hyponatremia, and possible overuse of unorthodox outpatient therapies; husband reported benzodiazepines and Ambien (a Z‑drug) among medications.
- Hospitalist Dr. Bruce Footit ordered a hold on chronic outpatient medications and treated hyponatremia and possible sepsis; Marcie later had a tonic‑clonic seizure and was discharged days later.
- Plaintiffs (the Beistlines) sued for medical malpractice, alleging the seizure resulted from abruptly discontinuing benzodiazepines/Z‑drugs in violation of the standard of care.
- Defendants moved for summary judgment supported by affidavit of a board‑certified internist (Dr. McIlraith) who opined withdrawal was appropriate given delirium, unknown dosing, and overdose risk.
- Plaintiffs’ sole opposing expert was a pharmacist (Dr. Holmquist) who attested that proper weaning protocols are required and that an internist should know them or consult pharmacy; superior court held his testimony insufficient under AS 09.20.185 and granted summary judgment.
- Plaintiffs appealed, arguing the pharmacist was qualified (or AS 09.20.185(b) applied) and that more time or a later expert disclosure should have been allowed; the Supreme Court affirmed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1. Whether the pharmacist expert met AS 09.20.185 qualifications to testify on the standard of care for a board‑certified internist | Holmquist was a licensed, experienced pharmacist whose area (weaning/discontinuation protocols) is directly related to the issue and thus qualifies under AS 09.20.185(a)(2) | Holmquist lacked training/experience in the same field/specialty as the defendant internist and lacked board certification in that specialty | Court: Even if Holmquist met some statutory criteria, his affidavit failed to show expertise sufficient to create a genuine factual dispute about the standard of care for an internist; summary judgment affirmed |
| 2. Whether an expert qualified under AS 09.20.185 is necessarily sufficient to meet the plaintiff’s burden under AS 09.55.540 | Meeting AS 09.20.185 suffices to prove a disputed standard of care | Plaintiff must also produce evidence with perspective on the specific field/specialty in which the defendant practices | Court: Qualification under AS 09.20.185 does not automatically satisfy the plaintiff’s burden under AS 09.55.540; expert must be able to show the relevant internist standard of care |
| 3. Whether the superior court erred in granting summary judgment before plaintiffs disclosed an internist expert or in denying more time to obtain one | Plaintiffs sought more time and argued expert disclosure deadlines had not passed; additional time was necessary and summary judgment was premature | Court afforded multiple extensions (totaling 83 days plus initial time) and plaintiffs had been dilatory | Court: No abuse of discretion in denying further continuances or finding summary judgment appropriate given plaintiffs’ delay and insufficient opposing evidence |
| 4. Whether AS 09.20.185(a)(3)’s board‑certification requirement applies given alleged lack of state recognition of boards (AS 09.20.185(b)) | AS 09.20.185(b) applies because no boards are officially recognized by the executive branch, so (a)(3) should not bar Holmquist | Defendants rely on the functional requirement that plaintiffs prove the standard of care for the specialty in which the defendant practices | Court: Did not decide the narrow statutory‑recognition argument; resolved case on adequacy of Holmquist’s affidavit under AS 09.55.540 and evidence rule standards |
Key Cases Cited
- Hymes v. DeRamus, 222 P.3d 874 (Alaska 2010) (expert in related specialty may be relevant under AS 09.20.185(a)(2))
- Hagen v. Strobel, 353 P.3d 799 (Alaska 2015) (medical malpractice requires expert proof of standard of care except in nontechnical cases)
- Kendall v. State, 692 P.2d 953 (Alaska 1984) (expert testimony requirement in malpractice cases)
- Christensen v. Alaska Sales & Serv., Inc., 335 P.3d 514 (Alaska 2014) (summary judgment burden shifts and plaintiff must raise specific facts to show a genuine issue)
- Dapo v. State, 454 P.3d 171 (Alaska 2019) (statutory interpretation principles)
- Erica G. v. Taylor Taxi, Inc., 357 P.3d 783 (Alaska 2015) (abuse of discretion review for extension of time rulings)