159 A.3d 88
R.I.2017Background
- Plaintiff Marcia Glassie and testator Donelson Glassie executed a 1993 property-settlement agreement requiring the testator to make an irrevocable will bequeathing a sum certain to secure his obligations under the agreement.
- Testator executed wills in 1993, 1998 (with a June 1998 codicil), and a final will in 1999; Family Court in 1998 approved a stipulation that the 1998 will/codicil complied with the agreement and that any modification of the bequest required Family Court or party agreement.
- The 1998/1999 testamentary provision bequeathed to plaintiff “the sum of $2,000,000.00, or such other amount as shall be then required to fully satisfy all of my remaining obligations *.”
- Testator died in 2011; plaintiff filed a $2,000,000 claim against the estate in 2012. Executor disallowed the claim; plaintiff sued in Superior Court seeking construction of the will and the bequest.
- On cross-motions for summary judgment the hearing justice awarded plaintiff the $2,000,000 bequest but reduced it by life-insurance proceeds (resulting net ~ $1.56 million), denied prejudgment interest, and awarded attorney’s fees. Both parties appealed.
- The Supreme Court vacated and remanded, holding that material issues of testamentary intent exist and that the Family Court stipulation did not preclude Superior Court adjudication; it also found errors in (a) reducing the bequest by life-insurance proceeds sua sponte, and (b) awarding attorney’s fees under the contract-fee statute.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Proper construction of the will's disjunctive bequest ("$2,000,000, or such other amount...") | The Family Court's 1998 stipulation and will language require a $2,000,000 specific bequest unless testator moved to reduce it; Glassie entitled to $2,000,000 | The disjunctive "or" shows testator intended plaintiff to receive only whatever amount was necessary to satisfy any remaining obligations; no obligations remained at death so no $2M | Ambiguity exists. Summary judgment was improper; factual determination of testamentary intent required. |
| Preclusive effect of the 1998 Family Court stipulation (res judicata/collateral estoppel) | The stipulation is a final Family Court determination precluding relitigation of the bequest issue | The Family Court lacked jurisdiction to adjudicate testamentary intent; stipulation did not decide will construction at death | Res judicata/collateral estoppel do not apply; no identity of issues and Family Court could not decide testamentary intent. |
| Reduction of bequest by life-insurance proceeds | Plaintiff: life-insurance proceeds are separate and should not offset the will bequest | Defendant implicitly argued estate should account for obligations; trial justice reduced award sua sponte | Court held reduction was improper because defendant did not raise it and there was no basis to link proceeds to the bequest. |
| Prejudgment interest and attorney's fees | Glassie: prejudgment interest applies because claim arises from contractual obligation; fees appropriate | Executor: testamentary award is not pecuniary contract damages; fees unavailable because issue was justiciable | Prejudgment interest denied (award is testamentary, not a contract/tort judgment). Attorney's-fee award vacated — § 9-1-45 for contract-fee awards inapplicable because this is not a breach-of-contract action and justiciable issues exist. |
Key Cases Cited
- Lazarus v. Sherman, 10 A.3d 456 (R.I. 2011) (primary objective in will construction is to ascertain testator's intent)
- Steinhof v. Murphy, 991 A.2d 1028 (R.I. 2010) (will-construction principles reaffirming intent-focused analysis)
- Rhode Island Hospital Trust Co. v. Thomas, 54 A.2d 432 (R.I. 1947) (each will considered in light of its language and circumstances; intent is paramount)
- Wright v. Zielinski, 824 A.2d 494 (R.I. 2003) (res judicata standard reviewed de novo)
- Ritter v. Mantissa Investment Corp., 864 A.2d 601 (R.I. 2005) (transactional approach to res judicata)
- Gott v. Norberg, 417 A.2d 1352 (R.I. 1980) (prejudgment-interest statute applies to contract and tort judgments per legislative amendments)
- Rhode Island Insurers' Insolvency Fund v. Leviton Mfg. Co., 763 A.2d 590 (R.I. 2000) (§ 9-21-10(a) inapplicable where statutory scheme defines recovery)
- In re Estate of Cantore, 814 A.2d 331 (R.I. 2003) (distinguishing testamentary awards from pecuniary contract/tort damages for prejudgment interest)
- Donelan v. Donelan, 741 A.2d 268 (R.I. 1999) (property-settlement agreements enforced as contracts when not merged into divorce decree)