Marchese v. Commonwealth, Department of Transportation, Bureau of Driver Licensing
169 A.3d 733
| Pa. Commw. Ct. | 2017Background
- Trooper stopped Anthony Marchese for vehicle-code violations, detected odor and observed marijuana; Licensee arrested for DUI and taken to hospital.
- At hospital, Marchese refused a warrantless request for a blood test after being read Pennsylvania’s DL‑26 implied consent warnings; DOT notified him of an 18‑month civil license suspension under 75 Pa. C.S. §1547(b)(1)(ii).
- Marchese timely appealed the civil suspension; the trial court upheld the suspension after briefing on Birchfield v. North Dakota.
- Marchese argued Birchfield and the unconstitutional‑conditions doctrine require invalidation of Pennsylvania’s implied‑consent civil suspension scheme when the state requests a warrantless blood draw.
- The Commonwealth Court affirmed, relying on (1) Birchfield’s limitation to criminal penalties, (2) controlling Pennsylvania precedent treating license suspensions as civil, and (3) the view that conditioning a driving privilege on implied consent to testing is reasonable.
Issues
| Issue | Marchese's Argument | DOT's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Birchfield invalidates PA’s implied‑consent civil license suspensions for refusal of a warrantless blood test | Birchfield prohibits penalizing refusal to warrantless blood test; should extend to civil suspensions | Birchfield limited to criminal penalties; does not disturb civil suspensions or evidentiary consequences | Birchfield does not invalidate PA’s civil license suspension scheme; suspension affirmed |
| Whether PA’s implied‑consent scheme violates the Fourth Amendment / unconstitutional conditions doctrine by conditioning driving privilege on consent to warrantless blood draw | Conditioning a license on surrendering Fourth Amendment rights is an unconstitutional condition | Driving is a regulated privilege; conditioning it on compliance with testing under pain of civil suspension is reasonable and permissible | Conditioning driving privilege on implied consent (civil suspension for refusal) is not an unconstitutional condition and does not violate the Fourth Amendment |
Key Cases Cited
- Birchfield v. North Dakota, 136 S. Ct. 2160 (U.S. 2016) (states may not criminally punish refusal of warrantless blood tests; did not cast doubt on civil implied‑consent sanctions)
- Dep’t of Transp., Bureau of Traffic Safety v. O’Connell, 555 A.2d 873 (Pa. 1989) (license suspension proceedings are civil/administrative)
- Boseman v. Dep’t of Transp., Bureau of Driver Licensing, 157 A.3d 10 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2017) (Birchfield does not apply to civil license suspensions under PA law)
- Regula v. Dep’t of Transp., Bureau of Driver Licensing, 146 A.3d 836 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2016) (elements DOT must prove to uphold a refusal‑based suspension and reasonable‑grounds standard)
- Bashore v. Dep’t of Transp., Bureau of Driver Licensing, 27 A.3d 272 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2011) (refusal‑based suspension is an administrative proceeding separate from criminal DUI)
- Plowman v. Dep’t of Transp., Bureau of Driver Licensing, 635 A.2d 124 (Pa. 1993) (driving is a privilege, not a property right)
- Dep’t of Transp., Bureau of Driver Licensing v. Scott, 684 A.2d 539 (Pa. 1996) (continuing eligibility for driving privilege may be conditioned on statutory requirements such as submission to testing)
- Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (U.S. 1968) (reasonable‑suspicion standard referenced for officer’s reasonable grounds)
- Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (U.S. 1961) (exclusionary rule purpose discussed)