Marchese v. Bos. Redevelopment Auth., 130 N.E.3d 1222

In 2003 the Boston Redevelopment Authority (BRA) used G. L. c. 121B, § 46(f) to take a ten-year surface easement interest in Yawkey Way (adjacent to Fenway Park) and licensed game-day exclusive use to the Red Sox to expand Fenway’s concourse.
With the temporary taking and license expiring, the BRA in 2013 adopted a § 46(f) demonstration project plan, executed a permanent taking of the same easement, and sold the easement to the Red Sox for about $4.8 million.
Plaintiff (local attorney/business owner) had sought to acquire the easement and argued the sale should have been put out to public bid under the Uniform Procurement Act, G. L. c. 30B; he sued under certiorari (G. L. c. 121B, § 47) challenging the taking and sale.
The Superior Court granted the BRA’s motion for judgment on the pleadings; plaintiff appealed; the Supreme Judicial Court transferred the case and affirmed below.
The court’s decision rests primarily on standing: it concluded plaintiff lacked a legally cognizable injury or duty owed to him (no property interest, no preexisting business harmed, and any benefit from a bid was speculative).
The opinion also holds that dispositions by an urban renewal agency under an approved plan are exempt from c.30B bidding requirements, and it affirmed denial of the plaintiff’s motion to amend as futile.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Standing to challenge 2013 taking	He was injured because BRA’s permanent taking and sale deprived him of the opportunity to bid and obtain easement rights	Plaintiff has no property or business interest in the easement, no legal duty was owed to him, and any injury is speculative	Plaintiff lacks standing; challenge dismissed for want of jurisdiction
Applicability of c.30B public-bidding requirement	Sale of easement required competitive bidding under G. L. c. 30B	Sale by BRA pursuant to an approved § 46(f) plan falls within c.30B § 1(b)(25) exemption for urban renewal agency dispositions	Exemption applies; sale was not subject to c.30B bidding
Validity of using § 46(f) (was area blighted?)	BRA misused § 46(f); area not blighted so taking invalid	BRA relied on prior legislative/agency findings and demonstration-plan authority; but court questioned standing first	Court did not reach merits; even if § 46(f) misuse occurred, plaintiff still lacks standing because any alternative outcome (reversion to city) would not guarantee bid or plaintiff’s business opportunity
Denial of motion to amend complaint	Proposed claims (monetary damages, G. L. c. 93A) should be allowed	Proposed amendments were futile given lack of standing and legal defects	Denial affirmed as not an abuse of discretion

Mahajan v. Dep't of Envtl. Protection, 464 Mass. 604 (discusses BRA as urban renewal agency and c.121B powers)
St. Botolph Citizens Comm., Inc. v. Boston Redev. Auth., 429 Mass. 1 (addresses urban renewal plans and agency approval requirements)
Benevolent & Protective Order of Elks, Lodge No. 65 v. Planning Bd. of Lawrence, 403 Mass. 531 (standing requires breach of duty owed to plaintiff)
Boston Edison Co. v. Boston Redev. Auth., 374 Mass. 37 (example of direct economic injury conferring aggrievement)
Ginther v. Commissioner of Ins., 427 Mass. 319 (standards for pleading standing on Rule 12(c) motion)
Indeck Me. Energy, LLC v. Commissioner of Energy Resources, 454 Mass. 511 (zone-of-interests/standing in administrative challenges)
Northeast Energy Partners, LLC v. Mahar Regional Sch. Dist., 462 Mass. 687 (purpose and operation of the procurement act)
Arbella Mut. Ins. Co. v. Commissioner of Ins., 456 Mass. 66 (speculative or indirect injuries do not confer standing)