Marchand v. Simonson
16 F. Supp. 3d 97
D. Conn.2014Background
- Plaintiff Marchand sues Simonson, the City of Willimantic, and the Town of Windham under §1983 for Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment violations and state-law claims.
- Defendants move for summary judgment on all claims; plaintiff is represented by counsel since 2013, but the case posture originated with pro se filings.
- Plaintiff contends a Fourth Amendment Monell claim for an unconstitutional taser-use policy and additional individual claims against Simonson in his official and personal capacities, plus state-law harassment.
- Key events include the March 8, 2008 encounter where Simonson initiated contact, conducted a confrontation on and near Marchand's residence, and deployed a taser after ordering Marchand off the property.
- Connecticut probable-cause disputes arise from arrest for interfering with an officer, trespass, or a parking infraction, with later criminal proceedings terminated by nolle prosequi.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the Willimantic and Windham defendants are proper parties after liberal pleading | Marchand’s amended complaint naming Willimantic and Windham suffices | Police Department was proper defendant, but substituted with municipalities; prior orders treated as substitute | Monetary and procedural substitutions permitted; claims proceed against municipal defendants |
| Whether Monell claims survive for taser policy, training, or supervision failures | Monell claim based on taser policy; defendants failed to train/supervise | No cognizable Monell claim for taser policy; failure-to-train/supervise dismissed due to abandonment | Monell claim for taser policy not pled; fail-to-train/supervise dismissed; taser-based Monell denied |
| Whether there was probable cause to arrest Marchand for false arrest claim | Arrest violated Fourth Amendment; lack of probable cause | Probable cause existed or, at minimum, arguable probable cause for trespass or interfering with officer | Actual probable cause for arrest lacking; but qualified immunity may apply due to arguable probable cause |
| Whether Simonson’s entry into the home violated Fourth Amendment and whether qualified immunity applies | Entry without warrant violated rights; not licensee if entry unconstitutional | Arguable probable cause and Terry-stop context; Stanton v. Sims supports qualified immunity | Qualified immunity applied; entry potentially unlawful but arguable; factual disputes require trial for reasonableness |
| Whether excessive force claim is viable and if qualified immunity shields defendant | Use of taser/movement to ground was excessive | Reasonableness of force under Graham v. Connor; jury must resolve disagreements about force | Excessive-force claim survives summary judgment; however, qualified immunity unresolved due to disputed facts |
Key Cases Cited
- Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (U.S. 1983) (probable cause must be assessed under totality of the circumstances)
- Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 317 (U.S. 2001) (custodial arrest for minor traffic violation; scope under state law)
- Devenpeck v. Alford, 543 U.S. 146 (U.S. 2004) (police may arrest for any offense supported by probable cause, regardless of the offense invoked)
- Martinez v. Simonetti, 202 F.3d 625 (2d Cir. 2000) (protection of qualified immunity; split-second judgments allowed)
- Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386 (U.S. 1989) (excessive force evaluated by reasonableness in context)
- Stanton v. Sims, 134 S. Ct. 3 (2013) (unsettled law on home-entry during hot pursuit; qualified immunity possible)
- Chavis v. Chappius, 618 F.3d 162 (2d Cir. 2010) (liberal construction of pro se pleadings does not conjure new claims)
- Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27 (U.S. 2001) (home privacy and exit from public scrutiny)