March for Life v. Burwell
128 F. Supp. 3d 116
D.D.C.2015Background
- Plaintiffs: March for Life (a secular pro-life nonprofit), and two employees (Monahan and Goodman) who oppose contraceptives on religious grounds; March for Life offers employer-sponsored coverage and does not qualify for the ACA "religious employer" exemption.
- The challenged rule: HHS/IRS/DOL regulations implementing the ACA require group health plans to cover FDA‑approved contraceptives without cost‑sharing; a narrow exemption exists for houses of worship and integrated auxiliaries but not for secular nonprofits that share anti‑contraceptive beliefs.
- Plaintiffs seek declaratory and injunctive relief to prohibit enforcement of the contraceptive coverage requirement against March for Life and the two employees' insurers.
- Record facts: March for Life’s insurer stated it would offer plans omitting contraceptive coverage if legally permitted; there are no material factual disputes and the court consolidated the preliminary injunction with the merits and treated the briefing as summary‑judgment ready.
- Procedural posture and disposition: Court granted plaintiffs summary judgment on (1) equal protection (Fifth Amendment), (2) RFRA, and (4) APA arbitrary/capricious claim; denied relief on the First Amendment free exercise claim; permanently enjoined defendants from enforcing contraceptive coverage against March for Life and the employee plaintiffs’ issuers.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Equal protection (Fifth Amendment): Does exempting houses of worship but not secular organizations that employ people who oppose contraceptives violate equal protection? | March for Life: similarly situated to exempt religious employers because both have employees who share anti‑contraceptive beliefs; the categorical exclusion of secular but like‑situated groups is irrational. | Government: exemption is limited to religious employers and is rationally related to respecting religious exercise; March for Life is not religious (so not similarly situated). | Court: Held for March for Life. The exemption irrationally discriminates against secular groups whose employees are identically situated regarding contraceptive use. |
| RFRA (individual plaintiffs): Does the Mandate substantially burden employees’ religious exercise and, if so, is the Mandate the least restrictive means of furthering a compelling interest? | Employees: participation in plans that include contraceptive coverage coerces them to violate sincere religious beliefs; burden is substantial and the government has less‑restrictive alternatives (permit insurers to sell plans without required coverage without penalty). | Government: Mandate furthers compelling interests (public health, gender equality, insurance market functioning); administrative/financial chaos would follow individualized exemptions (citing Lee). | Court: Held for employees under RFRA. The Mandate substantially burdens them and the government failed to show it is the least restrictive means; narrow relief ordered (prevent enforcement against plaintiffs and their issuers). |
| Free exercise (First Amendment): Is the Mandate subject to strict scrutiny because it is not neutral/general in applicability? | Plaintiffs: exemptions (houses of worship, grandfathered plans) make the law non‑neutral and not generally applicable, so strict scrutiny should apply. | Government: exemptions do not target religion or religious conduct; the regulation is neutral and generally applicable (following circuit precedent). | Court: Held for government. Applying D.C. Circuit precedent (Priests for Life), the Mandate is neutral and generally applicable; free exercise claim dismissed. |
| APA arbitrary/capricious challenge: Did HHS irrationally exclude secular nonprofits from the exemption while exempting houses of worship? | March for Life: HHS provided no rational basis for excluding secular groups with identical traits; rulemaking was arbitrary and capricious as applied to March for Life. | Government: Rule is within agency discretion to limit exemptions to religious employers to balance interests. | Court: Held for March for Life. The agency’s line‑drawing is arbitrary as applied and the APA claim succeeds. |
Key Cases Cited
- Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014) (RFRA framework and analysis of corporate religious objections to the contraceptive mandate)
- Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita Beneficente União do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418 (2006) (RFRA requires examining the government's compelling interest as applied to the particular claimant)
- Employment Div., Dept. of Human Resources v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990) (neutral, generally applicable laws and free exercise baseline)
- Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520 (1993) (tests for neutrality and general applicability under the Free Exercise Clause)
- United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252 (1982) (limits on religious exemptions where mandatory participation is essential to program functioning)
- Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996) (rational basis requires a relation between classification and object to be attained)
- Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432 (1985) (equal protection principles on treating similarly situated entities differently)
- Priests for Life v. U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 772 F.3d 229 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (D.C. Circuit decision addressing neutrality, general applicability, and RFRA issues under the contraceptive coverage regulations)
- Kaemmerling v. Lappin, 553 F.3d 669 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (RFRA substantial burden standard)