Marcel Williams v. Wendy Kelley
2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 7142
| 8th Cir. | 2017Background
- Marcel Williams was convicted in Arkansas of murder, rape, kidnapping, and aggravated robbery and sentenced to death; the Arkansas Supreme Court affirmed.
- Williams pursued state Rule 37 post-conviction relief and then federal habeas; the district court granted relief as to penalty-phase ineffective assistance, held an evidentiary hearing, and set aside the death sentence.
- On appeal the Eighth Circuit reversed in 2009, holding the state court’s Strickland prejudice determination was not unreasonable and that the district evidentiary hearing was barred by 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2); cert. denied.
- Williams later filed a new Rule 60(b)(6) motion, asserting Martinez/Trevino and Buck permit excuse of procedural defaults caused by ineffective post-conviction counsel and seeking to reopen the 2009 habeas denial; the district court denied relief but granted a certificate of appealability.
- On the eve of execution, Williams sought a stay pending appeal, arguing (1) a COA requires protective procedures and (2) Martinez/Trevino/Buck create extraordinary circumstances to warrant Rule 60(b) relief for both penalty- and guilt-phase ineffective-assistance claims.
- The Eighth Circuit denied the stay, holding Williams had negligible likelihood of success: his penalty-phase claim was an adjudicated-on-the-merits claim barred as a successive challenge under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(1), and his guilt-phase Martinez-based claims were untimely and failed to show extraordinary circumstances.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether issuance of a COA or Eighth Circuit Rule 47A requires a stay pending appeal | Williams: COA triggers procedural protections and stay pending full briefing | State: COA does not entitle a stay; Rule 47A does not mandate a stay; stays are equitable and discretionary | Denied — COA/Rule 47A do not require a stay; stays are discretionary and require showing of likelihood of success |
| Whether Rule 60(b)(6) relief is available for penalty-phase ineffective-assistance claims based on Martinez/Trevino/Buck | Williams: Martinez/Trevino and Buck excuse defaults caused by ineffective post-conviction counsel and constitute extraordinary circumstances warranting reopening | State: Penalty-phase claim was adjudicated on the merits by state courts and on appeal; Gonzalez bars relitigation via Rule 60(b) absent § 2244 authorization | Denied — claim was adjudicated on the merits and therefore is barred as a successive habeas attack under § 2244(b)(1); unlikely to succeed on the merits |
| Whether Williams’s Rule 60(b) motion is timely and presents extraordinary circumstances | Williams: recent Supreme Court decisions change the law and justify late Rule 60(b) relief | State: Motion was filed years after Martinez; filing on eve of execution shows dilatory tactics; extraordinary-circumstances requirement not met | Denied — untimely filing and failure to show extraordinary circumstances; piecemeal/dilatory conduct weighs against relief |
| Whether guilt-phase ineffective-assistance claims may be reopened under Martinez/Trevino | Williams: post-conviction counsel’s failure excused defaults per Martinez/Trevino; claims should be reviewed | State: Guilt-phase claims were procedurally defaulted and Williams delayed filing; Rule 60(b) relief not shown or timely | Denied — claims are not shown to meet Rule 60(b)(6) extraordinary-circumstances standard and were filed unreasonably late |
Key Cases Cited
- Martinez v. Ryan, 566 U.S. 1 (2012) (post-conviction counsel’s ineffectiveness may, in limited circumstances, excuse procedural default)
- Trevino v. Thaler, 569 U.S. 413 (2013) (extends Martinez to similar state procedural contexts)
- Buck v. Davis, 137 S. Ct. 759 (2017) (recognized Rule 60(b) relief may be appropriate in extraordinary circumstances where counsel’s performance infected post-judgment proceedings)
- Hill v. McDonough, 547 U.S. 573 (2006) (stay of execution is equitable and requires showing of significant possibility of success)
- Gonzalez v. Crosby, 545 U.S. 524 (2005) (Rule 60(b) attacks that amount to successive habeas claims are barred absent statutory authorization)
- Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) (two-prong standard for ineffective assistance: deficient performance and prejudice)
- Williams v. Norris, 576 F.3d 850 (8th Cir. 2009) (appellate decision reversing district court habeas relief and applying AEDPA/§2254(e)(2) constraints)