Marc S Throop v. Gull Lake Community Schools
335403
| Mich. Ct. App. | Nov 16, 2017Background
- Plaintiff was longtime full-time athletic director for Gull Lake Community Schools (GLCS), retired June 2013, then rehired August 2013 in a part‑time position under a 1‑page Memorandum.
- In Feb 2015 financial discrepancies were found in gate cash receipts; plaintiff admitted taking money but said it was for legitimate school purposes.
- Superintendent Christopher Rundle investigated, relieved plaintiff of duties, sent a termination letter, and issued a press release.
- Plaintiff sued GLCS and five employees for breach of contract, tortious interference, intentional infliction of emotional distress, defamation, false light, and gross negligence.
- Defendants moved for summary disposition arguing (1) plaintiff was an at‑will employee so no breach, and (2) governmental immunity barred the tort claims. Trial court granted summary disposition; plaintiff appealed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether plaintiff had a definite‑term or just‑cause employment contract | Plaintiff contends his long service and GLCS bylaws created a contractual expectation of just‑cause and/or definite term | Defendants point to the 1‑page Memorandum (no term, no just‑cause) and argue at‑will status | Memorandum controlled; no definite term or just‑cause; plaintiff was at‑will, so breach claim fails |
| Whether GLCS bylaws/policies created enforceable job‑security rights | Plaintiff says bylaws/procedures gave rise to a legitimate expectation of job security and required board approval for firing | Defendants say bylaws only set procedural disciplinary steps and do not negate at‑will presumption | Bylaws do not establish just‑cause or definite term; procedural provisions alone insufficient to overcome at‑will presumption |
| Whether GLCS (the school district) is liable for plaintiff’s tort claims | Plaintiff argues immunity exceptions apply or were not pleaded; seeks to hold district accountable | Defendants assert GLCS is a governmental agency performing a governmental function and is immune under GTLA | GLCS is a governmental agency engaged in a governmental function (school operations); immunity applies and plaintiff failed to plead an applicable exception |
| Whether individual defendants are immune (superintendent vs. lower‑level staff) | Plaintiff contends Rundle lacked authority for termination/press release and that low‑level staff were grossly negligent/proximate cause | Defendants assert absolute immunity for the highest executive (Rundle) acting within authority and statutory immunity for lower‑level employees absent gross negligence | Rundle (highest appointive executive) acted within executive authority and is absolutely immune; lower‑level employees were protected under GTLA because plaintiff failed to show gross negligence that was the proximate cause |
Key Cases Cited
- Lytle v. Malady, 458 Mich 153 (rebutting at‑will presumption requires definite term or just‑cause provision)
- Biggs v. Hilton Hotel Corp., 194 Mich App 239 (disciplinary procedures alone do not create just‑cause employment)
- Nawrocki v. Macomb Co. Rd. Comm'n, 463 Mich 143 (broad scope of governmental immunity under GTLA)
- Petipren v. Jaskowski, 494 Mich 190 (test for whether official acted within executive authority)
- Odom v. Wayne Co., 482 Mich 459 (distinction between high‑ranking official absolute immunity and lower‑level employee immunity)
- Tarlea v. Crabtree, 263 Mich App 80 (mere opportunity to have done more does not establish gross negligence)
- Radu v. Herndon & Herndon Investigations, Inc., 302 Mich App 363 (gross negligence requires substantially more than ordinary negligence)
- Barnard Mfg. Co., Inc. v. Gates Performance Eng’g, Inc., 285 Mich App 362 (standard of review for C(10) summary disposition)