Mara v. State, 391 P.3d 1236

Background

Mara was convicted in 1999 of reckless manslaughter, reckless endangering, and keeping a loaded firearm; sentenced to concurrent extended terms; judgment became final in 2002.
State sought extended terms under HRS §706-662 based on Mara’s prior felonies and multiple current felony convictions; court imposed extended terms and mandatory minimums.
Mara filed an HRPP Rule 40 petition in 2015 arguing his judge-imposed extended terms violated Apprendi and that appellate counsel was ineffective for not raising Apprendi on direct appeal; the trial court denied the petition relying on Loher v. State.
The State abandoned its trial-court position on appeal and argued Apprendi should allow collateral attack on Mara’s extended terms; the appellate court rejected the concession.
The court held that under Hawai‘i Supreme Court precedent, the demarcation point for collateral attacks on judge-imposed extended terms is Cunningham (not Apprendi), so sentences final after Apprendi but before Cunningham remain not subject to collateral attack.

Issues

Issue	Mara's Argument	State's Argument	Held
Whether Mara’s judge-imposed extended terms (final 2002) violate Apprendi	Extended terms were based on judge-found facts and thus illegal under Apprendi; appellate counsel ineffective for not raising it	Apprendi was the demarcation point — extended terms final after Apprendi may be collaterally attacked; Loher I is not good law	Denied: Under Hawai‘i Supreme Court precedent, Cunningham—not Apprendi—announced the new rule; Mara’s sentences (final 2002) are not subject to collateral attack and counsel was not ineffective
Whether this court must follow federal district/Ninth Circuit habeas holdings that applied Apprendi earlier	(implicit) Federal habeas decisions support Mara’s claim	State urged reliance on federal habeas rulings to vacate extended terms	Rejected: state courts bound only by U.S. Supreme Court and Hawai‘i Supreme Court precedent; lower federal decisions are not controlling
Whether Loher I remains good law for collateral-attack timing	Loher I should apply to sentences final between Apprendi and Cunningham	State contended Loher I is obsolete	Affirmed Loher I: it remains good law for collateral attacks on sentences final after Apprendi but before Cunningham
Retroactivity standard — when did the rule become "new" under Teague	Apprendi created the rule for Sixth Amendment jury findings	State argued Apprendi dictated invalidity of Hawai‘i scheme immediately	Held that the new-rule demarcation was dictated by Cunningham as interpreted by Hawai‘i Supreme Court; Teague bar applies to sentences final before Cunningham

Key Cases Cited

Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000) (Sixth Amendment jury-trial principle for facts increasing penalties)
Cunningham v. California, 549 U.S. 270 (2007) (Clarified Apprendi/Blakely rule for judge-found facts increasing maximum penalty)
State v. Maugaotega, [citation="115 Hawai'i 432"] (2007) (Hawai‘i Supreme Court changed course post-Cunningham and held Hawai‘i extended-term scheme unconstitutional)
Loher v. State, [citation="118 Hawai'i 522"] (App. 2008) (appellate court held Apprendi did not permit collateral attack on extended terms final in that window)
State v. Kaua, [citation="102 Hawai'i 1"] (2003) (Hawai‘i Supreme Court upheld extended-term scheme under Apprendi with intrinsic/extrinsic limits)
State v. White, [citation="110 Hawai'i 79"] (2006) (reaffirmed Hawai‘i scheme; declined to follow lower federal court decisions)
Kaua v. Frank, 436 F.3d 1057 (9th Cir. 2006) (Ninth Circuit granted habeas relief holding Kaua’s extended term violated Apprendi)
Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004) (further refinement of Apprendi principles)
United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005) (applied Apprendi/Blakely reasoning in federal sentencing context)
Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989) (framework for retroactivity and new-rule analysis)
Butler v. McKellar, 494 U.S. 407 (1990) (deference to reasonable, good-faith state-court interpretations later superseded by new rule)
Beard v. Banks, 542 U.S. 406 (2004) (clarified standard for when a new rule is "apparent to all reasonable jurists")