Maples v. Maples
289 Ga. 560
Ga.2011Background
- Husband and wife married in 1983; wife filed for uncontested divorce in 2000; final decree signed June 1, 2000 but not filed until August 1, 2002.
- During the interlude, the parties remarried on June 25, 2000 and continued to cohabit and raise children.
- In 2010, wife filed a new divorce action; both parties learned the 2000 decree had not been filed until 2002.
- In the 2000 case, the trial court entered a nunc pro tunc order reflecting the June 1, 2000 decree to reflect the true judgment.
- Husband appealed, challenging the nunc pro tunc order as an improper backdating of the divorce decree; the trial court’s nunc pro tunc entry was reviewed under Supreme Court Pilot Project rules.
- The Georgia Supreme Court affirmed the nunc pro tunc order, holding it a proper use to relate the decree back to the original hearing date.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the nunc pro tunc entry backdating the divorce decree was proper. | Maples contends backing the date is appropriate to reflect the true judgment. | Maples asserts Coleman prohibits backdating via nunc pro tunc in divorce cases. | Yes; the nunc pro tunc entry was proper. |
| Whether Coleman controls the outcome or Beard governs the decision. | Beard is distinguishable; it does not address nunc pro tunc validity. | Coleman suggests limitations on nunc pro tunc; here the action was appropriate. | Coleman does not control; the court approved the nunc pro tunc as proper. |
| Whether the trial court had authority to issue the nunc pro tunc order and relate back to the original date. | Order serves to correct the record and reflect precise timing of divorce. | Such backdating is improper in absence of action tied to the earlier judgment. | Yes; authority existed to relate back to the original date. |
Key Cases Cited
- Beard v. Beard, 285 Ga. 675, 681 S.E.2d 138 (2009) (Ga. 2009) (distinguishes nunc pro tunc from actual remarriage issues and notes timing of entry matters)
- Coleman v. Coleman, 240 Ga. 417, 240 S.E.2d 870 (1977) (Ga. 1977) (limits on nunc pro tunc where no action occurred; improper use in that context)
- Hinkle v. Woolever, 249 Ga.App. 249, 547 S.E.2d 782 (2001) (Ga. Ct. App. 2001) (illustrates proper recording of unrecorded actions by nunc pro tunc)
- Norman v. Ault, 287 Ga. 324, 695 S.E.2d 633 (2010) (Ga. 2010) (entry of decree nunc pro tunc to date of signing reflects intention and is advantageous)
- Richardson v. Barber, 241 Ga.App. 254, 527 S.E.2d 8 (1999) (Ga. Ct. App. 1999) (supports use of nunc pro tunc in related contexts)
- Kendall v. Peach State Machinery, 215 Ga.App. 633, 451 S.E.2d 810 (1994) (Ga. Ct. App. 1994) (nunc pro tunc to record a previously unrecorded action)