Manuel Nava, Jr. v. State
2015 Tex. App. LEXIS 11622
| Tex. App. | 2015Background
- Officer Ferguson observed an F-150 exit a parking lot; an unidentified man ran after the truck, then stopped and walked back toward the lot. Right as the truck’s passenger door opened, Ferguson stopped the vehicle driven by Manuel Nava, Jr.
- Nava moved to suppress evidence from the stop, arguing the officer lacked reasonable suspicion; the trial court denied the motion without taking testimony or affidavits and without a hearing.
- Nava pleaded guilty pursuant to a plea agreement immediately after denial and received a suspended one-year sentence with 18 months’ community supervision; he appealed.
- The Court of Appeals abated the appeal to obtain findings of fact and conclusions; the trial court then held a post-abatement hearing and read facts from the officer’s report into the record and entered findings supporting the stop.
- The appellate court held the trial court erred by admitting new evidence after abatement (the abatement did not authorize an evidentiary hearing) and therefore excluded the post-abatement evidence and findings from the appellate record.
- With only Nava’s unsworn suppression memorandum in the record, the Court concluded the State failed to meet its burden to show the stop was reasonable under either the community-caretaking exception or as based on reasonable suspicion of reckless driving; the conviction was reversed and remanded.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (State) | Defendant's Argument (Nava) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the traffic stop was justified under the community caretaking exception | Officer reasonably stopped vehicle to assist/ investigate a possible disturbance and welfare concern | No evidence officer acted for caretaking purposes; memorandum alone insufficient | Reversed: no evidentiary support in record to show caretaking motive; State failed its burden |
| Whether officer had reasonable suspicion of reckless driving to detain Nava | Opening passenger door while exiting lot justified suspicion of reckless driving | Record lacks facts about door opening, truck movement, or officer observations to support reasonable suspicion | Reversed: no specific, articulable facts in record supporting suspicion of reckless driving |
| Whether trial court could add evidence after appellate abatement | Trial court relied on post-abatement officer report/readings to justify stop | Post-abatement evidentiary hearing exceeded court’s limited mandate and altered appellate record | Reversed: post-abatement evidence excluded; trial court erred in admitting it |
| Harmless-error analysis for denial of suppression motion before guilty plea | Denial did not materially affect plea | Denial prevented presentation of defense and likely affected plea decision | Reversed: cannot say error was harmless; plea may have been influenced by suppression denial |
Key Cases Cited
- Ford v. State, 158 S.W.3d 488 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005) (standard of review for suppression rulings)
- Wiede v. State, 214 S.W.3d 17 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007) (trial court as finder of fact in suppression hearings)
- Wright v. State, 7 S.W.3d 148 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999) (factors for community caretaking exception)
- Abney v. State, 394 S.W.3d 542 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013) (defendant’s initial burden on motion to suppress)
- Amador v. State, 275 S.W.3d 872 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009) (burden shift to State to prove warrantless search reasonable)
- Bishop v. State, 85 S.W.3d 819 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002) (motion to suppress may allege Fourth Amendment violation sufficient to shift burden)
- Gutierrez v. State, 221 S.W.3d 680 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007) (State must prove exception to warrant requirement)
- Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (U.S. 1968) (reasonable suspicion standard for investigative stops)
- Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806 (U.S. 1996) (objective reasonableness of stops not determined by officer’s subjective motivation)
- Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433 (U.S. 1973) (community caretaking exception to warrant requirement)
- Holmes v. State, 323 S.W.3d 163 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010) (prejudice from denial of right to present a defense can render error harmful)
