Manuel Melendez Hernandez v. Attorney General United States, 712 F. App'x 206

Melendez, a Salvadoran national, was previously removed in 2006 and returned to the U.S.; his prior removal was reinstated in 2016 after new arrests. He sought withholding of removal and CAT protection based on fear of MS-13 retaliation.
He claimed past MS-13 membership, was recognized by tattoos, was forced to rejoin, later shot for failing to attend gang meetings, and was alleged to have cooperated with the FBI while in immigration custody.
The IJ denied relief; the BIA dismissed his appeal, finding (1) "former gang members" not a cognizable particular social group (PSG) and (2) Melendez failed to show a protected ground was a central reason for persecution; the BIA also denied CAT relief as speculative.
Melendez appealed to the Third Circuit, which reviews whether substantial evidence supports the BIA’s conclusions and whether the BIA adequately explained its PSG analysis.
The Third Circuit granted review: it remanded the withholding claim (holding the BIA provided insufficient analysis on PSG and centrality), but denied relief under the CAT (finding the chain of events to meet torture with state acquiescence was speculative).

Issue	Melendez's Argument	Government's Argument	Held
Whether "former gang members" (or former members who cooperated with law enforcement) is a cognizable particular social group for withholding of removal	Melendez: former gang membership and perceived cooperation with FBI is an immutable/past characteristic that defines a PSG	Gov: former gang members not a cognizable PSG; Melendez failed to identify a protected ground	Remanded to BIA for further PSG analysis—BIA’s conclusory rejection lacked case-specific application of M-E-V-G- factors
Whether membership in the asserted PSG (and perceived cooperation) was "one central reason" for persecution	Melendez: gang recognition (tattoos), prior violence, threats, and reported cooperation show centrality	Gov: harms were not motivated principally by a protected ground	Court found substantial evidence did not support BIA’s finding that the protected ground was not at least one central reason; remand required
Whether Melendez established entitlement to CAT relief based on likely torture by or with acquiescence of public officials	Melendez: gang will learn of cooperation, will find him, and officials will acquiesce or torture	Gov: links in the chain (recognition, gang violence, state acquiescence/torture) are speculative	Denied—substantial evidence supports BIA’s conclusion that the chain to state-facilitated torture is speculative and not more likely than not

Tarrawally v. Ashcroft, 338 F.3d 180 (defining withholding standard)
Gonzalez-Posadas v. Attorney General, 781 F.3d 677 (PSG and "one central reason" framework)
Filja v. Gonzales, 447 F.3d 241 (BIA must address issues sufficiently for review)
Garcia v. Attorney General, 665 F.3d 496 (past assistance to law enforcement can form a PSG)
Serrano-Alberto v. Attorney General, 859 F.3d 208 (PSG analysis is fact-specific and evolving)
Oliva v. Lynch, 807 F.3d 53 (distinguishing former gang status vs. punishment for violation of gang rules)
Sevoian v. Ashcroft, 290 F.3d 166 (standard for CAT state-agent torture/acquiescence)
Denis v. Attorney General, 633 F.3d 201 (unsupported speculation insufficient for CAT)
INS v. Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478 (burden and standards for asylum/withholding claims)
Kayembe v. Ashcroft, 334 F.3d 231 (review limited where BIA defers or adopts IJ findings)