113 F.4th 1126
9th Cir.2024Background
- Plaintiffs filed a class action alleging the Maricopa County Sheriff’s Office (MCSO) engaged in widespread racial profiling of Latinos under the pretense of immigration enforcement.
- After finding constitutional violations post-trial, the district court issued extensive injunctive relief, including appointment of a Monitor and later enhancements to address MCSO’s persistent non-compliance.
- Repeated failures by MCSO and its sheriffs (Arpaio, then Penzone, now Skinner) to comply with court injunctions led to civil contempt findings and several rounds of supplemental injunctions.
- The most recent (Third) Order created a Constitutional Policing Authority (CPA), assigning significant operational authority to the Monitor over MCSO internal investigations to address massive case backlogs and delayed discipline.
- The Sheriff appealed, challenging the breadth and legality of the Monitor’s authority and the procedures for judicial review of the Monitor’s decisions, as well as compliance with procedural rules.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Applicability of Rule 53 | Rule 53 does not apply as the Monitor was appointed under the court’s inherent equitable powers, not as a special master. | Rule 53 applies; the Monitor’s powers exceed those allowed under Rule 53 for special masters. | Monitor appointed under inherent powers, not Rule 53—its limits do not apply. |
| Separation of Powers/Article III | The Monitor’s duties are executive/administrative, not judicial, and thus lawful. | Vesting the Monitor with operational control impermissibly delegates judicial power and control over a government entity. | Court can delegate narrow operational authority to ensure compliance, especially after repeated non-compliance. |
| Judicial Review of Monitor’s Decisions | The First Order provides mechanisms for parties to seek review from the court, which still apply. | The new order omits express provisions for judicial review of Monitor's key decisions, making them unreviewable. | Judicial review is available via existing provisions; operational directives do not preclude review. |
| Specificity under Rule 65 | The detailed requirements for backlog reduction, timelines, and Monitor’s role satisfy Rule 65’s specificity. | The delegation of open-ended authority to the Monitor makes the injunction impermissibly vague. | Orders are sufficiently specific; Rule 65 is not violated. |
Key Cases Cited
- Melendres v. Arpaio, 695 F.3d 990 (9th Cir. 2012) (providing early background and first appellate review of MCSO racial profiling injunction)
- Melendres v. Arpaio, 784 F.3d 1254 (9th Cir. 2015) (further appellate consideration of injunction’s scope and compliance)
- Melendres v. Maricopa County, 815 F.3d 645 (9th Cir. 2016) (addressing continuing supervision issues)
- Melendres v. Maricopa County, 897 F.3d 1217 (9th Cir. 2018) (affirming further remedial orders for noncompliance)
- Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Ed., 402 U.S. 1 (1971) (district courts’ broad equitable powers to remedy constitutional violations)
- Plata v. Schwarzenegger, 603 F.3d 1088 (9th Cir. 2010) (receiverships and monitors as equitable remedies over government entities)
- Armstrong v. Brown, 768 F.3d 975 (9th Cir. 2014) (limits on delegation of judicial functions to non-judicial officers)
- SEC v. Lincoln Thrift Ass’n, 557 F.2d 1274 (9th Cir. 1977) (district courts may clarify their own orders)
- Fortyune v. Am. Multi–Cinema, Inc., 364 F.3d 1075 (9th Cir. 2004) (Rule 65 specificity is context-specific; detail in injunctions suffices)