Manuel De Jesus Ortega Melendr v. Paul Penzone, 16-16663

Plaintiffs obtained a § 1983 injunction in district court against Maricopa County and related defendants.
Gerard Sheridan, a now-retired county employee, was found in civil contempt for violating that injunction; he appealed the contempt finding.
After Sheridan filed an opening brief, plaintiffs moved to dismiss his appeal for lack of standing; the Ninth Circuit granted the motion and dismissed the appeal.
Plaintiffs sought attorney’s fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b) for work related to Sheridan’s appeal, including work on an answering brief they did not file.
The panel considered whether plaintiffs were “prevailing parties” for § 1988 purposes, whether a non-party contemnor like Sheridan could be liable for fees, and whether fees could be awarded for work on an answering brief that was never filed.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether plaintiffs are "prevailing parties" under § 1988 for work on Sheridan's appeal	Plaintiffs argued they prevailed because they obtained the injunction below and succeeded in dismissing Sheridan's appeal	Sheridan argued dismissal for lack of standing (not merits) means plaintiffs did not prevail on the appeal and thus are not prevailing parties for fees	Plaintiffs are prevailing parties: dismissal for standing does not negate prevailing-party status where the district-court relief remains intact
Whether a non-party contemnor can be held liable for § 1988 fee award	Plaintiffs argued Sheridan actively participated by appealing the contempt finding and so can be liable for fees	Sheridan relied on Kentucky v. Graham to argue a non-party cannot be liable for fee awards under § 1988	Non-party contemnors can be liable for fees where they actively inserted themselves and aided violations; Graham does not bar fee awards here
Whether plaintiffs can recover fees for preparing an answering brief they did not file	Plaintiffs sought fees for time spent preparing an answering brief prior to obtaining dismissal	Sheridan argued fees for work on a never-filed brief are not recoverable	Fees denied for work on the answering brief because plaintiffs did not prevail on the merits of the appeal and fees must be for work "expended in pursuit of the ultimate result achieved"

Sotomura v. County of Hawaii, 679 F.2d 152 (9th Cir. 1982) (plaintiffs treated as prevailing parties despite appeal dismissal unrelated to merits)
Ford v. Bender, 768 F.3d 15 (1st Cir. 2014) (plaintiff prevailed where appeal was dismissed as moot though district judgment was favorable)
Murphy v. Fort Worth Indep. Sch. Dist., 334 F.3d 470 (5th Cir. 2003) (similar rule on prevailing-party status after appeal dismissal)
Young v. City of Chicago, 202 F.3d 1000 (7th Cir. 2000) (same principle on prevailing-party determination)
Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159 (1985) (discussed scope of fee liability for non-parties and limits when a non-party did not actively participate)
Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424 (1983) (fee awards limited to work reasonably expended in pursuit of the ultimate result achieved)
Portland Feminist Women’s Health Ctr. v. Advocates for Life, Inc., 877 F.2d 787 (9th Cir. 1989) (non-party contemnors may be liable for attorney’s fees in contempt contexts)
Waffenschmidt v. Mackay, 763 F.2d 711 (5th Cir. 1985) (affirming fee awards against non-party contemnors who aided violations)
Gen. Ins. Co. of Am. v. E. Consol. Utils., Inc., 126 F.3d 215 (3d Cir. 1997) (affirming fee award from a non-party contemnor)