249 N.C. App. 322
N.C. Ct. App.2016Background
- Plaintiff Ashley Mannise (mother) filed a pro se Chapter 50B domestic violence protective-order complaint on Sept. 8, 2015 against Stephen Harrell (father), alleging threats and past physical abuse; she listed Harrell’s address in Pennsylvania.
- An Affidavit as to Status of Minor Child indicated the child lived with Plaintiff in Pennsylvania from Aug. 2012–Sept. 2015 and with Plaintiff in Lillington, NC beginning Sept. 6, 2015.
- The district court entered an ex parte domestic violence protective order the same day. The court later found Harrell threatened Mannise on Sept. 6, 2015 but made no finding that the alleged acts occurred in North Carolina.
- Harrell (via affidavit) asserted he has been a Pennsylvania resident since Aug. 2012, denied any North Carolina contacts, and moved to dismiss under Rules 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(2). The trial court denied the motion, reasoning either jurisdiction existed or a prohibitory order could be entered even without personal jurisdiction.
- Harrell filed notice of appeal before the written order was entered; the Court of Appeals invoked Rule 2 to treat the filings as a petition for certiorari and proceeded to review the personal-jurisdiction issue. The appellate court reversed for lack of personal jurisdiction.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether NC courts had personal jurisdiction over nonresident defendant in a Chapter 50B action | Mannise relied on the complaint (threat on Sept. 6) and child-affidavit to infer the threat occurred after she arrived in NC; counsel "forecast" the phone threat occurred while she was in NC | Harrell argued he was a Pennsylvania resident since 2012, had no NC contacts, and his uncontroverted affidavit showed no acts in NC | Reversed: plaintiff failed to produce prima facie evidence of contacts with NC; trial court erred in inferring jurisdiction from counsel’s forecast and entered protective-order restrictions violated due process without personal jurisdiction |
| Whether denial of 12(b)(1) subject-matter-jurisdiction motion was immediately appealable | Mannise did not press immediate appealability of subject-matter ruling | Harrell sought review of both personal- and subject-matter-jurisdiction rulings; argued appealable under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1‑277(b) | Appeal of denial of subject-matter (12(b)(1)) is interlocutory and not immediately appealable; court did not decide subject-matter issue (only personal-jurisdiction) |
Key Cases Cited
- Tom Togs, Inc. v. Ben Elias Indus. Corp., 318 N.C. 361 (court must apply long-arm statute then due-process analysis for personal jurisdiction)
- International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (established due-process "minimum contacts" standard)
- Griffith v. N.C. Dep’t of Corr., 210 N.C. App. 544 (rendering of judgment in open court is not the entry of judgment for appeal purposes)
- Bruggeman v. Meditrust Acquisition Co., 138 N.C. App. 612 (plaintiff’s prima facie burden when jurisdictional challenge is decided on affidavits)
- A.R. v. M.R., 351 N.J. Super. 512 (discussing telephone threats as equivalent to pursuit in domestic-violence context)
- Shah v. Shah, 184 N.J. 125 (distinction between prohibitory and affirmative orders in issuing domestic protective orders)
- Spencer v. Spencer, 191 S.W.3d 14 (adopting New Jersey distinction and discussing entry of prohibitory orders against nonresidents)