Manning v. Caldwell for City of Roanoke, 930 F.3d 264

Background

Virginia law permits civil "interdiction" orders against persons found to have "shown himself to be an habitual drunkard," and interdicted persons face enhanced criminal penalties (including up to 12 months’ jail) for possessing, purchasing, or consuming alcohol.
The statute contains no definition or objective standards for "habitual drunkard," and interdiction hearings often occur in absentia.
Named plaintiffs are homeless persons who allege alcohol use disorder and that they have been interdicted and repeatedly prosecuted under the interdiction-based criminal provisions despite not necessarily having prior alcohol-related convictions.
Plaintiffs sued under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments raising: cruel and unusual punishment, due process, equal protection, and vagueness claims; the district court dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6).
On en banc review the Fourth Circuit reversed: it held the statutory term "habitual drunkard" unconstitutionally vague and, alternatively, that as-applied to persons whose alcohol use is an involuntary manifestation of illness, the scheme violates the Eighth Amendment.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Vagueness of "habitual drunkard"	The phrase gives no objective standards; fails to provide fair notice and allows arbitrary enforcement	The common meaning is clear; statute’s requirement that one has "shown himself" to be a habitual drunkard plus practice supplies notice	Term is unconstitutionally vague as written and as applied to plaintiffs—statute lacks minimal standards to guide persons and officials
Eighth Amendment: criminalizing conduct tied to addiction	Interdiction + criminal penalties effectively criminalize illness by punishing involuntary manifestations of alcoholism (nonvolitional drinking/public intoxication)	Statute punishes acts (possession/consumption/public intoxication), not status; Powell allows punishing volitional acts even if defendant is alcoholic	As-applied claim plausible: under Robinson and controlling Powell concurrence, punishing involuntary, illness-compelled conduct can violate Eighth Amendment; plaintiffs stated a claim
Procedural: waiver/abandonment of vagueness on appeal	Plaintiffs had litigated vagueness in district court; en banc consideration is warranted due to public importance and record sufficiency	Plaintiffs expressly declined to press vagueness on initial appeal and waived the issue	En banc exercised discretion to consider the previously abandoned vagueness claim; no prejudice and issue suitable for resolution
Precedent: Fisher and Marks application to Powell	Fisher upheld the Virginia scheme and treated Powell plurality as controlling; plaintiffs argue Fisher was wrongly decided	Commonwealth relies on Fisher and reads Powell as allowing prosecution of alcohol-related acts	En banc overruled Fisher; treated Justice White’s concurrence in Powell (Marks) as controlling and applied Robinson principles to bar punishment of involuntary illness-driven conduct

Key Cases Cited

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009) (standard for pleading and Rule 12(b)(6) review)
Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962) (Eighth Amendment bars criminalizing status/illness)
Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514 (1968) (plurality/dissent/White concurrence: distinction between status and act; White’s concurrence controls under Marks)
Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188 (1977) (rule for identifying controlling opinion in fractured Supreme Court decisions)
Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352 (1983) (vagueness doctrine requires minimal guidelines to govern law enforcement)
Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156 (1972) (vagueness and arbitrary enforcement concerns in vagrancy statutes)
Village of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, 455 U.S. 489 (1982) (different vagueness standards for civil vs. criminal statutes)
Fisher v. Coleman, 639 F.2d 191 (4th Cir. 1981) (prior Fourth Circuit decision upholding Virginia scheme; expressly overruled)
Martin v. City of Boise, 920 F.3d 584 (9th Cir. 2019) (circuit decision addressing similar issues regarding enforcement against homeless persons)