357 F. Supp. 3d 106
D.D.C.2019Background
- Manning was an office clerk (hired 1999) whose duties required daily in‑office presence and specialized on‑the‑job training for replacements.
- In 2013–2014 Manning developed a heart condition and then depression/anxiety/panic attacks; she took multiple paid, often open‑ended medical leaves which the Water Works granted.
- Supervisors repeatedly documented performance problems and a contentious attitude; the Board twice considered discipline and declined to terminate until August 26, 2014.
- By termination Manning had missed 81 of 124 workdays in the last six months and 129 of 249 in the last year (≈65% and 52% respectively); most absences were for medical leave.
- Manning’s EEOC charge checked discrimination and retaliation, described disability‑related absences and alleged they were held against her; she did not expressly request accommodations beyond medical leave or articulate specific reasonable accommodations to supervisors.
- District court found Manning exhausted administrative remedies as to a failure‑to‑accommodate claim but granted summary judgment to the Water Works because Manning could not show she could perform essential functions with a reasonable accommodation or identify a reasonable, feasible accommodation she requested.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Manning exhausted administrative remedies for a failure‑to‑accommodate ADA claim | EEOC charge described disability‑related absences and termination while on leave; that gave notice of a failure‑to‑accommodate claim | EEOC charge did not explicitly assert failure to accommodate and EEOC dismissal discussed only disability discrimination | Court: Exhaustion satisfied — charge, read liberally, put employer/EEOC on notice and failure‑to‑accommodate could reasonably grow from it |
| Whether Manning could perform essential functions of her job (with or without accommodation) | Manning contends disabilities caused absences and that medical leave and workplace adjustments were needed to enable work | Water Works: position requires daily presence; extensive, open‑ended absences precluded performing essential functions; it already granted generous leave | Court: Manning could not perform essential functions — attendance is essential and her absences (≈50–65%) were dispositive |
| Whether requested or constructive accommodations were reasonable and were denied | Manning argues her medical‑leave notes and communications sufficed as (constructive) requests; she also sought altered supervisory conduct (less criticism) | Water Works: only accommodation requested/granted was leave; open‑ended, recurring leave was unreasonable and replacing clerk would be burdensome; request for changed supervision was never specified and would be unreasonable | Court: No sufficiently specific request for a reasonable accommodation beyond leave; prolonged open‑ended leave was unreasonable; proposed change in supervisory feedback was not a reasonable accommodation as a matter of law |
Key Cases Cited
- Calero‑Cerezo v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 355 F.3d 6 (1st Cir. 2004) (summary judgment standards and materiality in context of civil rights claims)
- Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242 (1986) (standard for evaluating summary judgment and drawing inferences)
- Bonilla v. Muebles J.J. Alvarez, Inc., 194 F.3d 275 (1st Cir. 1999) (ADA Title I exhaustion requirement via EEOC charge)
- Lattimore v. Polaroid Corp., 99 F.3d 456 (1st Cir. 1996) (scope of EEOC charge limits civil complaint and exhaustion analysis)
- Jones v. Nationwide Life Ins. Co., 696 F.3d 78 (1st Cir. 2012) (plaintiff must specify needed accommodations and causal link to disability)
- Rios‑Jimenez v. Principi, 520 F.3d 31 (1st Cir. 2008) (attendance is an essential function of a job)