Mangan v. Texas Roadhouse Mgt. Corp.
2021 Ohio 2201
| Ohio Ct. App. | 2021Background
- On Oct. 25, 2015, Griselda Lopez‑Hernandez was struck and killed by a hit‑and‑run driver while walking home after clocking out from a Texas Roadhouse restaurant operated by TRMC.
- Appellants (the estate and family) sought workers' compensation benefits; the BWC and Industrial Commission denied the claim administratively.
- Appellants filed a trial‑court appeal under R.C. 4123.512; TRMC moved for summary judgment, arguing the injury was a non‑compensable commuting injury under the coming‑and‑going rule.
- The trial court granted summary judgment for TRMC; appellants appealed, arguing genuine fact issues existed and that the "special hazard" exception to the coming‑and‑going rule applied.
- The court found (and appellants did not dispute) Lopez‑Hernandez was a fixed‑situs employee who began substantial duties only at the restaurant, and held the special‑hazard exception did not apply because her commute risks were not distinctive or quantitatively greater than those faced by the public.
- Summary judgment was affirmed: the death did not arise "in the course of" and "arise out of" employment under R.C. 4123.01(C).
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether decedent is a fixed‑situs employee | (conceded) Lopez‑Hernandez worked only after arriving at the restaurant | TRMC: she was fixed‑situs (worked on‑site, paid only for hours on site) | Court: fixed‑situs employee (appellants do not contest) |
| Whether the "special hazard" exception to the coming‑and‑going rule applies | Variable "flex" shifts, long hours, dark conditions, dark clothing, inability to drive/undocumented status, and language barrier created an employer‑related special hazard | TRMC: single permanent worksite, short/ordinary commute, risks were common to the public and not dictated by employer | Court: Special‑hazard exception not met; commute risks not distinctive or quantitatively greater; Ruckman factors not satisfied |
| Whether summary judgment was improper due to factual disputes | Appellants: genuine issues of material fact should preclude summary judgment | TRMC: undisputed facts and law entitle it to judgment as a matter of law | Court: no genuine issue of material fact; summary judgment proper and affirmed |
Key Cases Cited
- Ruckman v. Cubby Drilling, Inc., 81 Ohio St.3d 117 (Ohio 1998) (defines fixed‑situs rule and the "special hazard" exception to the coming‑and‑going rule)
- Friebel v. Visiting Nurse Assn. of Mid‑Ohio, 142 Ohio St.3d 425 (Ohio 2014) (both "in the course of" and "arising out of" required for compensability)
- Fisher v. Mayfield, 49 Ohio St.3d 275 (Ohio 1990) (factors for causal connection between employment and injury)
- MTD Prods., Inc. v. Robatin, 61 Ohio St.3d 66 (Ohio 1991) (coming‑and‑going rule bar to commuting injuries)
- Lord v. Daugherty, 66 Ohio St.2d 441 (Ohio 1981) (proximity, employer control, employer benefit factors for causation)
- Slagle v. White Castle Sys., Inc., 79 Ohio App.3d 210 (10th Dist. 1992) (risks of travel in the dark are not per se a special hazard)