Malvo v. Mathena
254 F. Supp. 3d 820
E.D. Va.2017Background
- Lee Boyd Malvo, a juvenile at the time, received life-without-parole sentences in two Virginia matters: Chesapeake (jury conviction, 2003) and Spotsylvania (Alford plea, 2004). Both included additional firearm terms.
- Virginia law then made life without parole the only term for capital murder/attempted capital murder; parole was unavailable for sentences after Jan. 1, 1995.
- Malvo filed two 28 U.S.C. § 2254 habeas petitions in 2013 challenging those life-without-parole sentences under Miller and Montgomery; initial denials were later remanded by the Fourth Circuit after Montgomery.
- The Commonwealth (Respondent) argued Miller/Montgomery do not apply (because Virginia’s scheme is discretionary), that Malvo’s crimes justify LWOP, that Chesapeake sentencing satisfied Miller, and that Malvo waived challenges in Spotsylvania by plea.
- The district court concluded Virginia juveniles sentenced to LWOP are entitled to Miller protections regardless of whether the state scheme is labeled mandatory or discretionary, found the Chesapeake judge did not perform the required Miller inquiry, and held the Spotsylvania plea did not waive the Miller right or validly bind Malvo to LWOP on public-policy grounds.
- The court denied the motion to dismiss and granted Malvo’s § 2254 petitions: vacating the LWOP sentences in both cases and remanding both matters for resentencing (or otherwise disposition) in accordance with Miller and Montgomery.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Does Miller/Montgomery apply to Malvo’s LWOP sentences? | Miller/Montgomery require individualized Miller inquiry for juveniles; apply to Malvo. | Virginia’s scheme is discretionary (courts can suspend), so Miller’s mandatory-scheme rule doesn’t apply. | Miller/Montgomery apply whenever a juvenile is sentenced to LWOP; the Eighth Amendment requires the Miller inquiry regardless of state labeling. |
| Exhaustion of state remedies | Malvo: state remedies are ineffective / untimely under VA law, so federal review is available. | Respondent contended exhaustion issues but agreed state remedies would be ineffective. | State habeas deadlines and Virginia precedent make state relief ineffective; exhaustion requirement is excused. |
| Did Chesapeake sentencing satisfy Miller (individualized inquiry)? | Malvo: judge did not consider youth-related mitigating factors per Miller. | Respondent: jury’s findings and sentencing process satisfied Miller. | Judge record lacked evidence of the required Miller determination; Miller violation found—resentencing required. |
| Did Malvo waive Miller rights by Alford plea in Spotsylvania? | Malvo: plea did not and could not knowingly waive Miller’s Eighth Amendment right (no record of such waiver). | Respondent: plea provisions (and agreement to LWOP) waive challenges. | Waiver of Miller right not knowing/intentional; LWOP sentence term in plea unenforceable on public-policy grounds—sentence vacated and remanded. |
Key Cases Cited
- Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012) (mandatory LWOP for juveniles violates Eighth Amendment; individualized sentencing required)
- Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S. Ct. 718 (2016) (Miller is retroactive; states must remedy Miller violations via resentencing or parole consideration)
- Tatum v. Arizona, 137 S. Ct. 11 (2016) (remand in light of Montgomery; concurrence stresses sentencer must determine whether juvenile offenders are irreparably corrupt)
- Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 (2010) (proportionality principle and limits on life-without-parole for juveniles in nonhomicide cases cited as precedent)
- United States v. Lemaster, 403 F.3d 216 (4th Cir. 2005) (distinguishes direct appeal waivers from collateral-attack waivers; discusses enforceability of collateral waivers)