Malloy v. Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority
187 F. Supp. 3d 34
| D.D.C. | 2016Background
- Malloy, a WMATA train operator for 15 years, was involved in workplace incidents in January 2013 (an altercation with supervisor Rachael Corbie and an earlier safety-switch incident) and was placed on medical leave after a fitness-for-duty evaluation.
- Dr. Thomas recommended psychological treatment and required verification from Malloy’s providers before return; WMATA suspended and then terminated Malloy in September 2013 for failing to provide the requested medical documentation.
- Malloy filed grievances; the Union (Local 689) pursued arbitration but dropped the grievance after Malloy refused to produce a recording of his medical evaluation that the Union believed was necessary for arbitration.
- Malloy filed this pro se suit (amended complaint) in 2015 asserting hybrid §301/duty-of-fair-representation claims, various torts (IIED, defamation, malpractice), fraud/constitutional claims, and conspiracy theories; defendants moved to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6).
- The court concluded Malloy’s hybrid claims were time-barred under DelCostello’s six-month limitations period and that remaining claims either failed to state a plausible claim or were barred by WMATA’s sovereign immunity under the WMATA Compact; the motion to disqualify Union counsel was denied.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Timeliness of hybrid §301/duty-of-fair-representation claims | Malloy argued he did not receive actual notice the grievance was dropped until Jan 20, 2015 and filed timely after in forma pauperis process | Defendants argued the six-month DelCostello period began when grievance was dropped and Malloy filed too late (he refiled with fee Sept 15, 2015) | Court: Claims governed by DelCostello six-month rule; Malloy knew/should have known Jan 20, 2015; his refiling was untimely and not equitably tolled sufficiently — hybrid claims dismissed |
| Tolling for in forma pauperis application | Malloy sought tolling for pendency of and notice after IFP denial | Defendants noted long delay between IFP denial and filing with fee | Court: Considered pendency and precedent allowing a brief grace period, but found Malloy’s delay (25 days after denial) unexplained and insufficient to save claims |
| Sufficiency of remaining tort/criminal and statutory claims | Malloy argued multiple torts, frauds, constitutional and criminal acts by defendants | Defendants argued these claims lack factual plausibility and some are nonjusticiable | Court: Most remaining counts fail Twombly/Iqbal plausibility standards or lack a legal theory; criminal-prosecution allegations nonjusticiable for private plaintiff; dismissed |
| WMATA immunity under WMATA Compact for tort claims | Malloy pursued IIED, defamation, malpractice against WMATA | WMATA asserted sovereign immunity under Compact §80 for discretionary/governmental functions | Court: Personnel decisions (hiring, removal, fitness for duty) are discretionary/governmental; WMATA immune; tort claims dismissed |
| Motion to disqualify Union counsel | Malloy moved to disqualify Local 689 and its counsel | Union argued representation in arbitration does not mandate disqualification in subsequent suit; no grounds shown | Court: Malloy provided no basis for disqualification; motion denied |
Key Cases Cited
- DelCostello v. Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151 (establishing hybrid §301/fair-representation claims and adopting a six-month limitations period)
- Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (plausibility pleading standard for surviving a Rule 12(b)(6) motion)
- Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (application of plausibility standard and rejection of conclusory allegations)
- Beebe v. WMATA, 129 F.3d 1283 (discussing WMATA Compact immunity and waiver for proprietary functions)
- Burkhart v. WMATA, 112 F.3d 1207 (personnel decisions are discretionary under the WMATA Compact and shielded by immunity)
- Emory v. United Air Lines, Inc., 720 F.3d 915 (D.C. Cir.) (when plaintiff knew or should have known for statute-of-limitations purposes)