Mallory v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 3:19-cv-00744

Plaintiff Beatriz I. Mallory owns two Pennsylvania properties that were the subject of a Stipulation (Aug. 1, 2011) resolving two state-court actions; Wells Fargo was the mortgage servicer.
Mallory filed a Fourth Amended Complaint in state court (removed to federal court) asserting TILA, UTPCPL, breach of contract, defamation, and related claims alleging Wells Fargo failed to comply with the Stipulation.
Mallory separately filed a Petition for Civil Contempt in state court (also removed) alleging Wells Fargo violated the same Stipulation.
Wells Fargo moved to consolidate the two federal actions under Fed. R. Civ. P. 42(a); both cases are at the same procedural posture and discovery has not begun.
The court found the core legal question in both actions—whether the Stipulation was violated or breached—is common, the parties and counsel are the same, evidence overlaps (the Stipulation), and consolidation would avoid duplicative litigation and conflicting judgments.
The court rejected Mallory’s arguments that consolidation would be prejudicial or prevent enforcement of remedies, and granted the motion to consolidate.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether the two cases should be consolidated under Rule 42(a)	Mallory argued the contempt petition has a separate legal standard and different causes of action require distinct handling	Wells Fargo argued both actions involve common questions of law and fact (the same Stipulation and parties) and consolidation would promote efficiency	Consolidation granted: cases share common questions and consolidation avoids duplicative, potentially conflicting litigation
Whether consolidation would unfairly prejudice Mallory	Mallory contended consolidation would deny enforcement rights, protection from foreclosure, contempt sanctions, and increase unreimbursed fees	Wells Fargo argued consolidation does not merge causes or change parties' rights and will reduce expense and burden	Court held consolidation would not prejudice Mallory and would not bar enforcement of the Stipulation if appropriate
Whether differing legal standards (contempt vs. contract/UTPCPL/TILA/etc.) preclude consolidation	Mallory asserted different elements/standards for contempt vs. other claims require separate proceedings	Wells Fargo and court: differing legal standards are immaterial to consolidation when common facts and documents exist; the court can apply distinct standards within a consolidated case	Court held differing standards do not prevent consolidation; issues can be adjudicated fairly in a consolidated action

A.S. ex rel. Miller v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 769 F.3d 204 (3d Cir. 2014) (district courts have broad power to consolidate cases sharing common questions)
Ellerman Lines, Ltd. v. Atl. & Gulf Stevedores, Inc., 339 F.2d 673 (3d Cir. 1964) (consolidation avoids inconsistent results and duplicative trials)
Walton v. Eaton Corp., 563 F.2d 66 (3d Cir. 1977) (consolidation is administratively efficient for possibly duplicative actions)
Bernardi v. City of Scranton, 101 F.R.D. 411 (M.D. Pa. 1983) (court must balance time savings against potential prejudice from consolidation)
Liberty Lincoln Mercury, Inc. v. Ford Mktg. Corp., 149 F.R.D. 65 (D.N.J. 1993) (denying consolidation where required evidence and issues were materially different)
Newfound Mgmt. Corp. v. Lewis, 131 F.3d 108 (3d Cir. 1997) (consolidation does not merge suits or alter parties' rights)
Bradgate Assocs., Inc. v. Fellows, Read & Assocs., Inc., 999 F.2d 745 (3d Cir. 1993) (consolidated cases are not necessarily merged for all purposes)
Johnson v. Manhattan Ry. Co., 289 U.S. 479 (1933) (historical principle that consolidation does not change parties' substantive rights)