Mallory v. Norfolk Southern R. Co
216 L. Ed.2d 815
SCOTUS2023Background
- Robert Mallory, a former Norfolk Southern freight-car mechanic, sued Norfolk Southern under the Federal Employers’ Liability Act alleging cancer from workplace exposures; he filed in Pennsylvania state court though his alleged exposures and residence were in Ohio and Virginia.
- Norfolk Southern is incorporated and headquartered in Virginia but has long conducted extensive, systematic business in Pennsylvania and registered there as a foreign corporation, naming a registered office to receive process.
- Pennsylvania statutes provide that qualification as a foreign corporation confers the same rights and liabilities as a domestic entity and that qualification is a sufficient basis for exercise of general personal jurisdiction.
- The Pennsylvania Supreme Court held the statute unconstitutional under the Due Process Clause; the U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari.
- The U.S. Supreme Court (majority) vacated and remanded, holding Pennsylvania Fire controls and that Norfolk Southern’s long-continued registration constituted consent (waiver) to suit in Pennsylvania; the Court did not resolve Commerce Clause challenges and left them for remand (Alito concurred on that point). Dissent argued this decision undermines Daimler and modern contacts-based limits on general jurisdiction.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether PA law requiring registration to do business (and treating qualification as a basis for general jurisdiction) violates the Due Process Clause | Mallory: statute valid; registration = consent to suit | Norfolk Southern: statute violates Due Process and modern general-jurisdiction limits | Court: Constitution permits registration-based consent here; Pennsylvania Fire controls; statute not invalid on Due Process grounds as applied |
| Whether Pennsylvania Fire was overruled by International Shoe and later cases | Mallory: Pennsylvania Fire remains good law | Norfolk Southern: International Shoe and subsequent precedent implicitly overruled Pennsylvania Fire | Court: Pennsylvania Fire not overruled; International Shoe did not displace consent-based jurisdiction; lower courts must follow controlling precedent |
| Whether Norfolk Southern actually consented/waived via registration | Mallory: company knowingly registered and appointed an office to receive process; that is consent/waiver | Norfolk Southern: registration formalities are not true consent and did not expressly accept general jurisdiction | Court: Norfolk Southern’s long-standing registration and use of Pennsylvania’s market constitutes voluntary submission/waiver of personal-jurisdiction objections |
| Whether federalism or dormant Commerce Clause constraints independently forbid registration-based general jurisdiction | Mallory: consent/waiver defeats those concerns | Norfolk Southern: PA’s rule intrudes on other States and unduly burdens interstate commerce | Court: Majority declined to decide Commerce Clause; Alito concurred that a Commerce Clause challenge might succeed on remand; majority held no federalism bar where defendant consented |
Key Cases Cited
- Pennsylvania Fire Ins. Co. of Philadelphia v. Gold Issue Mining & Milling Co., 243 U.S. 93 (1917) (upholds registration/power-of-attorney consent-to-suit statutes under Due Process)
- International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945) (establishes minimum-contacts fair-play standard for nonconsensual jurisdiction)
- Burnham v. Superior Court of California, 495 U.S. 604 (1990) (confirms traditional tag jurisdiction and survival of historical bases)
- Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S. A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915 (2011) (describes limits on general jurisdiction)
- Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117 (2014) (confines general jurisdiction to a defendant’s domicile/home forum)
- BNSF R. Co. v. Tyrrell, 581 U.S. 402 (2017) (holds in-state business alone insufficient for general jurisdiction over unrelated claims)
- Insurance Corp. of Ireland v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694 (1982) (personal-jurisdiction objections are waivable; consent is a valid ground)
- Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186 (1977) (addresses limits of pre-International Shoe precedents and quasi in rem jurisdiction)
- World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980) (due process protects defendants and preserves interstate federalism limits on forum reach)