Mallory v. Norfolk Southern R. Co
600 U.S. 122
| SCOTUS | 2023Background
- Robert Mallory, a former Norfolk Southern freight-car mechanic, sued Norfolk Southern in Pennsylvania under the Federal Employers' Liability Act alleging work-related cancer from exposures in Ohio and Virginia.
- At the time Mallory sued, he lived in Virginia; Norfolk Southern was incorporated and headquartered in Virginia but had registered to do business in Pennsylvania since 1998 and operated extensive rail infrastructure there.
- Pennsylvania law conditions a foreign corporation’s right to do business on registration and provides that qualification permits Pennsylvania courts to exercise general personal jurisdiction over the registrant.
- The Pennsylvania Supreme Court held the statutory registration/registration-as-jurisdiction scheme violated the Due Process Clause and sided with Norfolk Southern; the U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari.
- The Supreme Court vacated the Pennsylvania judgment, holding Pennsylvania Fire controls and that Pennsylvania’s registration scheme (as applied here) does not violate the Fourteenth Amendment; the Court remanded and left open a dormant Commerce Clause challenge.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Mallory) | Defendant's Argument (Norfolk Southern) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether PA may condition registration to do business on submission to general personal jurisdiction | Registration is an express statutory condition and therefore constitutes consent to suit in PA | Due Process forbids subjecting a corporation to general jurisdiction in a State where it is not "at home" merely because it registered; registration cannot override constitutional limits | SCOTUS: Pennsylvania Fire controls; registration here amounts to consent and does not violate Due Process; judgment vacated and remanded |
| Whether International Shoe and later cases implicitly overruled Pennsylvania Fire | Pennsylvania Fire remains good law and governs consent-based jurisdiction | International Shoe established modern limits (minimum contacts) that render Pennsylvania Fire obsolete | SCOTUS: International Shoe expanded jurisdictional bases but did not implicitly overrule Pennsylvania Fire; lower courts must follow direct Supreme Court precedent |
| Whether asserting jurisdiction here is unfair or raises federalism/fugitive-state sovereignty concerns | Norfolk Southern voluntarily registered and had extensive operations in PA; exercising jurisdiction is fair | Subjecting a non-"at home" corporation to jurisdiction for claims with no PA connection is unfair and intrudes on sister-state sovereignty | SCOTUS majority: exercise of jurisdiction here is not unfair; consent/waiver controls; federalism concerns matter more when defendant has not consented; some Justices noted other constitutional limits may apply |
| Whether the registration scheme violates the dormant Commerce Clause | (Mallory did not press a Commerce Clause defense) | The scheme imposes burdens and unpredictability on interstate commerce and may be unconstitutional under the Commerce Clause | SCOTUS: Did not decide Commerce Clause; Justice Alito (concurring) said dormant Commerce Clause is the appropriate vehicle and remand allows Norfolk Southern to pursue that claim |
Key Cases Cited
- Pennsylvania Fire Ins. Co. v. Gold Issue Mining & Milling Co., 243 U.S. 93 (1917) (upholding state-law consent power of attorney/registration as compatible with Due Process)
- International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945) (established minimum-contacts/fair-play-and-substantial-justice framework for nonconsenting defendants)
- Burnham v. Superior Court, 495 U.S. 604 (1990) (upheld tag jurisdiction; recognized preservation of some traditional bases of jurisdiction)
- Goodyear Dunlop Tires Ops., S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915 (2011) (clarified limits of general jurisdiction; a corporation is typically "at home" only in place of incorporation and principal place of business)
- Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117 (2014) (reaffirmed narrow scope of general jurisdiction and rejected broad "doing business" tests)
- BNSF Ry. Co. v. Tyrrell, 581 U.S. 402 (2017) (held in-state operations alone insufficient for general jurisdiction over unrelated claims)
- Insurance Corp. of Ireland v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694 (1982) (confirmed personal-jurisdiction defenses are waivable; consent can found jurisdiction)
- Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186 (1977) (stressed International Shoe’s contacts focus and overruled inconsistent quasi in rem doctrines)
- World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980) (recognized Due Process serves individual fairness and interstate federalism limits)
- Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1878) (early territorial/presence-based foundations of personal jurisdiction cited for historical context)