689 F.Supp.3d 317
E.D. La.2023Background
- On November 21, 2021, multiple officers (including LSP Officer Nicholas Dowdle) fired a total of 36 rounds at Jabari Asante‑Chioke; autopsy showed 24 gunshot wounds and death. A bystander had reported Asante‑Chioke appeared visibly distressed and was carrying a gun and knife.
- Video allegations: officers ordered him to the ground; he jogged away, briefly put the gun to his head, then raised his right arm holding the gun to about 45 degrees when officers began shooting; he dropped the gun “almost immediately,” after which officers continued firing.
- Plaintiff Malikah Asante‑Chioke (daughter) sued individually and as representative, asserting § 1983 excessive‑force claims, wrongful death/survival/battery and state negligent‑training/supervision claims against officers and supervisors (including Col. Lamar A. Davis).
- Plaintiff voluntarily dismissed the State of Louisiana (DPSC); Davis and Dowdle moved to dismiss under Rules 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6).
- Court rulings: denied dismissal for lack of subject‑matter jurisdiction under the Eleventh Amendment (claims against Davis in his individual capacity survived); dismissed vicarious‑liability § 1983 claims against Davis; denied dismissal of Davis‑supervisory negligent‑training claim and denied dismissal of Dowdle on the § 1983 excessive‑force claim (qualified immunity not resolved at pleading stage).
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Eleventh Amendment bars Plaintiff's state‑law claims against Col. Davis in his individual capacity | Asante‑Chioke asserts Davis is sued in his individual capacity for negligent supervision/training and not as a state actor; no allegation that state indemnity makes the state the real party in interest | Davis contends claims are effectively official‑capacity/state claims and thus barred by Eleventh Amendment because state is real party in interest | Denied — fact issues about indemnification and legal‑binding party mean Eleventh Amendment dismissal inappropriate at this stage |
| Sufficiency of negligent supervision/training claim against Davis (individual capacity) | Alleges Davis knew of systemic LSP training failures (esp. de‑escalation/mental‑health response), publicly acknowledged problems, and acted with deliberate indifference causing constitutional injury | Davis says supervisory § 1983 liability cannot be based on respondeat superior and alleges insufficiently specific training allegations | Denied — complaint pleads specific historical/factual allegations (defective de‑escalation training; Davis' knowledge) sufficient to survive 12(b)(6) |
| Whether Louisiana discretionary immunity bars Davis' negligent‑training claim | Asante‑Chioke argues allegations show operational failures, not protected discretionary policymaking | Davis invokes La. Rev. Stat. §9:2798.1(B) and contends training/policy choices are discretionary and immune | Denied at pleading stage — Davis failed to show the acts are discretionary policy decisions grounded in protected policy; immunity is an affirmative defense to be addressed later |
| Sufficiency of § 1983 excessive‑force claim against Dowdle and impact of qualified immunity | Alleges officers continued firing after Asante‑Chioke dropped the gun and was incapacitated, making later shots unreasonable | Dowdle argues plaintiff fails to allege how many shots he fired or timing and that qualified immunity requires a heightened pleading | Denied — Twombly/Iqbal standard met: allegations that majority of shots occurred after incapacitation plausibly support an excessive‑force claim and discovery may reveal which shots Dowdle fired; qualified immunity not resolved now |
Key Cases Cited
- Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (establishes pleading standard for plausible claims)
- Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (plausibility pleading standard and requirement to raise claim above speculative level)
- Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21 (individual‑capacity suits against state officials permitted under § 1983)
- Lewis v. Clarke, 581 U.S. 155 (indemnification/payment by sovereign does not automatically make sovereign the real party in interest for Eleventh Amendment purposes)
- Roque v. Harvel, 993 F.3d 325 (officer may not continue using deadly force after suspect has been incapacitated)
- Plumhoff v. Rickard, 572 U.S. 765 (officers may continue firing until a severe threat ends; subsequent rounds may be unlawful if suspect was already incapacitated)
- Thompkins v. Belt, 828 F.2d 298 (supervisory liability under § 1983 cannot be based on respondeat superior)
- Porter v. Epps, 659 F.3d 440 (standards for supervisory liability and deliberate indifference in training claims)