Malik v. Deyarmin, N16A-07-006 AML

Background

Theresa Deyarmin worked as a legal secretary for John Malik from Jan. 2008 until Feb. 29, 2016; Malik fired her for alleged poor performance and misconduct (missed calendaring, failing to send Rule 16 discovery letters, and inadequate phone logs).
Deyarmin applied for unemployment benefits; a claims deputy initially found she was discharged for just cause (disqualified), but the appeals referee reversed and awarded benefits, finding no willful or wanton misconduct.
Malik appealed to the Unemployment Insurance Appeal Board, which affirmed the referee, concluding termination was for poor performance (not willful/wanton misconduct) and relied on Starkey precedent about mere inefficiency.
Malik appealed the Board’s decision to Superior Court, arguing the Board ignored or failed to address substantial evidence of repeated misconduct (Oct. 2015–Feb. 2016), prior warnings, and that some acts exposed him to potential professional liability.
The Superior Court held that the Board’s factual findings were inadequate: the Board did not resolve or explain material conflicting evidence (e.g., extent/timing of warnings, whether conduct created professional liability), so the Court could not determine if substantial evidence supported the decision or the law was properly applied.
Result: the Superior Court reversed and remanded for further proceedings with instructions for the Board to make specific factual findings addressing the disputed material evidence.

Issues

Issue	Malik's Argument	Deyarmin's Argument	Held
Whether Board's decision was supported by substantial evidence	Board ignored sustained evidence (emails, exhibits) of repeated performance failures and prior warnings; misconduct was willful/wanton and exposed employer to professional liability	Referee and Board accepted that errors occurred but characterized them as isolated mistakes/inefficiency, not willful misconduct	Court held Board’s factual findings were inadequate—could not determine whether substantial evidence supported the decision; remanded for fuller findings
Whether failures (missed Rule 16 letters, calendaring) constituted willful and wanton misconduct	Such omissions—especially those risking professional liability—amount to just cause; prior warnings made termination justified without additional notice	Failures were inefficiency/good-faith errors that do not rise to willful/wanton misconduct under Starkey	Court did not decide merits; remanded for Board to clarify how it evaluated willfulness and warnings in light of evidence
Whether Board considered material allegations and evidence (emails, testimonies, alleged warnings)	Board failed to explain whether it credited or rejected employer’s documentary evidence and testimony about repeated misconduct and warnings	Board’s summary treated errors as admitted mistakes by claimant; claimant argued employer tolerated issues and last incident was final straw	Court found the Board failed to resolve or explain material conflicts and omissions in its findings; remand required so Board can explicitly address and resolve material evidence
Whether legal standard (just cause/willful and wanton) was correctly applied	Board misapplied law by relying on Starkey without assessing extent, repetition, warnings, and potential for professional liability	Board applied Starkey to conclude mere poor performance insufficient for disqualification	Court declined to rule on legal error due to inadequate findings but allowed Malik to raise legal arguments on remand

Key Cases Cited

Thompson v. Christiana Care Health Sys., 25 A.3d 778 (Del. 2011) (defines scope of appellate review and limits on weighing credibility)
Oceanport Indus., Inc. v. Wilmington Stevedores, Inc., 636 A.2d 893 (Del. 1994) (definition of substantial evidence for administrative findings)
Olney v. Cooch, 425 A.2d 610 (Del. 1981) (principles on judicial review of administrative factfinding)
Barnes v. Panaro, 238 A.2d 609 (Del. 1968) (administrative board must make factual findings adequate for court review)