82 Cal.App.5th 181
Cal. Ct. App.2022Background
- Decedent Andrew Farkas owned Parcels 5 and 18; his widow Collette McLaughlin (through attorneys Wickers) filed probate petitions seeking to establish an access easement (the "Tradewinds Route").
- The Fourth Amended Petition named several neighboring owners and, in April 2017, added Sal Maleti and Maleti Corp.; neither respondent then held any present interest in the subject parcels (Maleti Corp. sold Parcel 18 in 1993; no interest after 2000).
- Over successive pleadings and motions the Maleti respondents prevailed: five claims removed after a demurrer sustained with leave to amend and not repleaded; one claim dismissed on demurrer without leave; three claims disposed by summary judgment (two on statute-of-limitations grounds).
- After entry of judgment in the probate action, Carol Maleti (Sal’s executor) sued McLaughlin and her attorneys for malicious prosecution and abuse of process. The attorneys moved to strike under Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 425.16 (anti‑SLAPP).
- The trial court granted the anti‑SLAPP motion as to abuse of process but denied it as to malicious prosecution and denied attorneys’ fee request. On appeal the Court of Appeal: affirmed denial as to malicious prosecution, affirmed striking abuse of process, but reversed the denial of fees and remanded for a fee award for the attorneys’ partial success.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Carol) | Defendant's Argument (Attorneys) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1) Whether a malicious‑prosecution plaintiff can satisfy the "favorable termination" element when the prior suit contained multiple claims that all failed and at least one failure was on the merits | Carol: Favorable termination is satisfied because the Maleti respondents prevailed on all claims and at least six were terminated on substantive grounds or by abandonment after demurrer with leave | Attorneys: Favorable termination requires that the entire prior action be resolved in favor of the defendant on the merits; partial procedural wins are insufficient | Held: Where the prior plaintiff is entirely unsuccessful and at least one claim was resolved substantively for the defendant, that overall termination can reflect on the merits and satisfy favorable termination. Carol made a prima facie showing here. |
| 2) Whether Carol showed lack of probable cause and malice (anti‑SLAPP second prong) for malicious prosecution | Carol: Attorneys lacked probable cause because Maleti/Corp. did not hold present interests required under quiet‑title/probate provisions; further, facts support malice (knowledge of no interest, inadequate investigation, late subpoena service, pressure to settle) | Attorneys: They had reasonable grounds and conducted discovery (including Maleti’s deposition) and expert consultations before adding Maleti; any defects were not willful | Held: Court concluded Carol made a sufficient prima facie showing of absence of probable cause (statutory/jurisdictional defects and section 762.010 requirements) and of malice (circumstantial inferences from continuing to prosecute after known deficiencies). Anti‑SLAPP denial as to malicious prosecution was proper. |
| 3) Whether the abuse of process claim was adequately pleaded | Carol: Naming Maleti (knowing he lacked interest and was in poor health) and prosecuting was done to extract settlements—constitutes abuse of process | Attorneys: Allegations only describe the filing/maintenance of suit; abuse of process requires misuse of procedural tools beyond improper motive | Held: Abuse of process requires a willful, improper use of process distinct from filing a meritless suit. Complaint did not allege misuse of procedural tools; trial court properly struck the abuse of process claim. |
| 4) Whether attorneys are entitled to §425.16(c)(1) fees when their anti‑SLAPP motion succeeded in part | Attorneys: Prevailing in part on anti‑SLAPP entitles them to fees for the successful portion | Carol: Partial success yielded no practical benefit, so fees were discretionary to deny | Held: A defendant who prevails in part is generally a prevailing defendant entitled to fees unless the result produced no practical benefit. The trial court abused its discretion in denying fees here; remand to calculate reasonable fees for the successful strike of abuse of process. |
Key Cases Cited
- Jarrow Formulas v. LaMarche, 31 Cal.4th 728 (Cal. 2003) (anti‑SLAPP framework; malicious prosecution claims arise from protected petitioning)
- Bertero v. National General Corp., 13 Cal.3d 43 (Cal. 1974) (malicious prosecution may be based on one ground in a multi‑theory suit; prohibits "shotgun tactics")
- Lackner v. LaCroix, 25 Cal.3d 747 (Cal. 1979) (favorable termination must reflect on the merits; technical/procedural dismissals generally do not qualify)
- Casa Herrera, Inc. v. Beydoun, 32 Cal.4th 336 (Cal. 2004) (look at judgment as a whole to determine whether termination reflected on merits)
- Crowley v. Katleman, 8 Cal.4th 666 (Cal. 1994) (distinguishes favorable termination from probable cause; favorable termination requires resolution of the entire action)
- Sheldon Appel Co. v. Albert & Oliker, 47 Cal.3d 863 (Cal. 1989) (probable cause is objective—whether a reasonable attorney would find suit tenable; attorney investigation bears on malice)
- Wilson v. Parker, Covert & Chidester, 28 Cal.4th 811 (Cal. 2002) (anti‑SLAPP second prong: plaintiff must show legal sufficiency and prima facie evidence of claim)
- Mann v. Quality Old Time Service, Inc., 139 Cal.App.4th 328 (Cal. Ct. App. 2006) (defendant who prevails in part on anti‑SLAPP is generally entitled to fees unless the partial victory yielded no practical benefit)