Malden Transp., Inc. v. Uber Techs., Inc.
386 F. Supp. 3d 96
D.D.C.2019Background
- Boston regulated taxis via Rule 403 and a Vehicle for Hire Ordinance requiring hackney driver and carriage licenses; the Hackney Department and Police Commissioner enforced those rules.
- Uber launched UberX (a P2P/TNC service) in June 2013 without requiring drivers to comply with Boston Taxi Rules, believing the rules applied only to taxis and not TNCs.
- From mid-2013 to Jan 2015, dozens or hundreds of Uber drivers were cited; Uber reimbursed many tickets while privately acknowledging enforcement risk and publicly asserting legality.
- Massachusetts enacted the TNC Act in August 2016, preempting municipal regulation of TNCs and assigning jurisdiction to state agencies; plaintiffs limit their claim period to June 2013–August 2016.
- Plaintiffs (medallion owners) sued alleging unfair competition and Chapter 93A violations, seeking summary judgment on liability and defendants’ §3 and superseding-cause defenses; defendants cross-moved on liability and res judicata and §3 defenses.
- The court denied cross-motions for summary judgment except it granted plaintiffs partial summary judgment rejecting defendants’ §3 (safe-harbor) affirmative defense; reserved factual questions (egregiousness, damages, causation, aiding/abetting, conspiracy, res judicata/privity, superseding cause) for bench trial.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Uber violated Chapter 93A via per se §2(c) violation of regulations | Taxi Rules protected public welfare; Uber’s noncompliance is per se unfair | §3.16 (AG reg) does not apply to business-to-business disputes; no per se liability | Court: Declined per se finding; §3.16 not dispositive for business disputes — denied summary judgment for both sides |
| Whether Uber’s conduct was "egregious" unfair competition under Chapter 93A | Uber knowingly flouted Taxi Rules, reimbursed tickets, exploited non-enforcement — rascality | Uber acted in good faith, relied on city statements and regulatory ambiguity | Court: Evidence shows reckless disregard but factual dispute about egregiousness remains — reserved for trial |
| Whether plaintiffs suffered recoverable damages (loss in medallion value) | Medallion owners suffered actual economic loss during period; economic damages recoverable under §11 | No protectable property in diminished medallion value; causation/speculation arguments | Court: Economic (not property) damages may be recovered for proven loss in the alleged period — summary judgment denied on damages issue |
| Whether §3 safe-harbor shields Uber | City/regulators tacitly permitted Uber; enforcement forbearance is affirmative permission | Mere non-enforcement or subsequent statements do not constitute affirmative permission under §3; regulators did not issue written approvals | Court: Defendants failed to show affirmative, authorized permission; plaintiffs’ partial SJ on §3 defense granted |
| Whether enactment of the TNC Act is a superseding/intervening cause | TNC Act was foreseeable and influenced by Uber; not an independent superseding cause | TNC Act breaks causal chain and relieves liability; lobbying protected | Court: Causation sufficient to survive summary judgment for plaintiffs, but whether TNC Act is a superseding cause is disputed — reserved for trial |
| Whether res judicata bars suit (privity with prior Boston Cab action) | Prior litigation did not bind Anoush plaintiffs; no privity or authorization for EJT to bind them | Prior Boston Cab judgment/prior parties were in privity with present plaintiffs | Court: Defendants likely waived res judicata by late assertion; material disputes about privity exist — summary judgment denied on res judicata |
Key Cases Cited
- Mesnick v. Gen. Elec. Co., 950 F.2d 816 (1st Cir. 1991) (summary judgment assesses need for trial)
- Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (U.S. 1986) (burden-shifting standard on summary judgment)
- Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. 242 (U.S. 1986) (reasonable jury standard for genuine issue)
- LimoLiner, Inc. v. Dattco, Inc., 809 F.3d 33 (1st Cir. 2015) (AG regulations under §3.16 do not apply to business-to-business §11 claims)
- LePage v. Bumila, 407 Mass. 163 (Mass. 1990) (payment of citation does not automatically admit underlying violation)
- Aspinall v. Philip Morris, Inc., 453 Mass. 431 (Mass. 2009) (§3 safe-harbor requires affirmative permission, not mere overlapping regulation)
- Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Attorney Gen., 479 Mass. 312 (Mass. 2018) (definition of unfairness under Chapter 93A)
- Davignon v. Clemmey, 322 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2003) (res judicata/waiver—affirmative defenses must be timely raised)